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INTRODUCTION
[C]ontinued treatment, however well intentioned, is now inhumane and is
causing suffering. From a medical standpoint, it is outside the bounds of
what I consider to be medically indicated care.I
The legal revolution that established the right of patients and their families to
decline life-sustaining treatment was accomplished through a patchwork of court cases
and state statutes. For the competent, those patients able to make informed choices
about their medical care, the revolution is complete. For the incompetent, it is not. The
patchwork of laws is marred by gaps that compel health care providers to force
treatment in certain cases, regardless of the pain or bodily degradation that treatment
may cause.
This Article exposes these gaps in the laws that prohibit surrogates from making
treatment decisions for the incompetent and explores the dire results of their
limitations. Part I sets forth the laws that give most people or their surrogates the
ability to avoid harmful treatment at the end of life and explains the genesis of the
limitations of those laws. Part II examines the case of Sheila Pouliot, a New York
resident who was subjected to a torturous death as a result of New York's limitations
on surrogate decisionmaking. Part III explains how the ultimate result of the Pouliot
case-the state-mandated inhumane treatment of an incompetent individual--could be
repeated in the several states throughout the country that place limitations on the ability
of surrogates to make decisions for others.2 Part IV demonstrates that terminating
treatment may be as essential to appropriate palliative care as the administration of
opioids. It then analyzes post-Cruzan cases that make pain control and the incompetent
patient's right to medically appropriate treatment integral components of the liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and argues that the vitalist
limitations on end-of-life medical care that cause prolonged suffering for limited
groups of disabled individuals illegally deprive those people of those rights and violate
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Finally, Part V proposes that courts must act to
stop states from mandating the provision of life-prolonging treatment for the
incompetent when the treatment becomes inhumane or medically inappropriate, and
1. Kathy Faber-Langendoen, M.D., progress note entered into Shiela Pouliot's medical
chart, February 29, 2000 (on file with author) [hereinafter Faber-Langendoen progress note].
2. New York, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Wisconsin, and Utah place a variety of limits on the ability of certain surrogates to make
medical decisions for certain patients. See infra Part Im (exploring the parameters of the
limitations set by each of these states).
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then discusses the possibility that the Pouliot case itself, through the resulting lawsuit
brought against state officials, 3 might ultimately establish limitations to the existing
vitalist laws.
I. BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT OF PATIENTS AND THEIR SURROGATES TO FORGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
The past thirty years have seen a radical shift from medical paternalism to patient
autonomy as "the gold standard for ethical decision-making ' 4 in medicine. Patient
choice and self determination are now of automatic and paramount concern in doctor-
patient relationships, and in ethical and legal discussions of difficult treatment cases.
Thus, a competent individual may voluntarily forgo life-sustaining medical treatment,
including nutrition and hydration, in any state in the country.5 The right to decline
treatment, which is rooted in both constitutional and common law,6 is protected by
statutes in all fifty states that ensure that a person's wish to forgo life-sustaining
treatment be carried out even when the person later loses competency.
7
3. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 02-7997
(2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2003).
4. Jerry A. Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1091 (1998). See
also S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to
Refuse Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1035, 1037 (1998).
5. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (indicating that
competent persons have a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment...").
6. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,724 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793,
795 (1997) (declaring that "everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent,
to refuse unwanted life saving treatment"). The importance of the right to decline medical
treatment was recently affirmed-and invigorated in Sell v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 2174
(2003).
7.
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (Supp. 2002) (living will statute)
ALA. CODE § 22-8A-6 (Supp. 2002) (proxy statute)
ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (Supp. 2002) (surrogacy statute)
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -.100 (Michie 2002) (living will statute)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332 to -.358 (Michie 2002) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Arizona: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3261 to -3262 (West 2003) (living will
statute)
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3281 to -3287 (West 2003) (proxy statute)
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231 (West 2003) (surrogacy statute)
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003)
(living will statute)
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003)
(proxy statute)
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-9-602, 20-17-214 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003)
(consent generally) (surrogacy statute)
California: CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4650-4677, 4700-4701 (West Supp. 2003) (living
will statute)
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4680-4690 (West Supp. 2003) (proxy statute)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8 (West 2000)
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4711-4716 (West Supp. 2003) (surrogacy statute)
Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1997 & Supp. 2002) (living will
2004]
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statute)
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-14-501 to -509 (1997 & Supp. 2002) (proxy
statute)
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18.5-101 to -103 (1997 &Supp. 2002) (surrogacy
statute)
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -580d (2000 & Supp. 2003) (living will
statute)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-43, 19a-570 to -571 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (proxy
statute)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -571 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (surrogacy
statute)
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2503-2505 (Supp. 2003) (living will statute)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2503-2505 (Supp. 2003) (proxy statute)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507 (Supp. 2003) (surrogacy statute)
D.C.: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-601, 7-621 to -630 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (living will
statutes)
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2205 to -2213 (2001) (proxy statute)
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2210 to -2213 (2001) (surrogacy statute)
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.301-306 (Supp. 2003) (living will statute)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.401-.404 (Supp. 2003), amended by Long Term
Care Facilities-Professional and Public Guardians Act, ch. 2003-57, 2003
Fla. Session Law Serv. § 5 (West) (proxy statute)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.202, .205 (Supp. 2003) (surrogacy statute)
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (2001) (living will statute)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (proxy statute)
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (2001) (surrogacy statute)
Hawaii: HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 327E-3 to -4, -16 (Supp. 2001) (living will statute)
HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 327E-5 to -16 (Supp. 2001) (proxy statute)
HAW. REv. STAT. § 327E-5 (Supp. 2001) (surrogacy statute)
Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4504 to -4509 (Michie 2002) (living will statute)
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (Michie 2002) (proxy statute)
IDAHO CODE § 39-4303 (Michie 2002) (surrogacy statute)
Illinois: 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 to 35/9 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003) (living
will statute)
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4-1 to 4-11 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003)
(proxy statute)
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 to 40/65 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003)
(surrogacy statute)
Indiana: IND. CODE §§ 16-36-4-1 to -21 (1997 & Supp. 2002) (living will statute)
IND. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to 30-5-10-4 (particularly 30-5-5-17) (1997 & Supp.
2002) (proxy statute)
IND. CODE §§ 16-36-1-1 to -14 (1997 & Supp. 2002) (surrogacy statute)
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A. I to -. 12 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (living will
statute)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1 to -. 12 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (proxy
statute)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West Supp. 2003) (surrogacy statute)
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3051 (Supp. 2002) (living will statute)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625 to -632 (1994) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.623-.628 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2002) (living
will statute)
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (Michie 2001) (proxy statute)
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.631 (Michie 2001) (surrogacy statute)
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Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.3-.10 (West 2001)
(living will statute)
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2997(6) (West Supp. 2003) (proxy statute)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.53 (West 2001) (surrogacy statute)
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-802 to -804 (West 1998 & Supp.
2002) (living will statute)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-802 to -804 (West 1998 & Supp.
2002) (proxy statute)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805 (West Supp. 2002) (surrogacy
statute)
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 5-601 to -618 (2000) (living will
statute)
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 5-601 to -618 (2000) (proxy statute)
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-605 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (surrogacy
statute)
Massachusetts: (no living will statute)
MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D §§ 2-7 (Law. Co-op 1994 & Supp. 2003)
(proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Michigan: (no living will statute)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.5501-.5520 (West 2001) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145C.02-.05 (Supp. 2003) (living will statute)
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145C.02-.05 (Supp. 2003) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-205 to -209 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (living will
statute)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-205 to -209 (1999 & Supp. 2002) (proxy
statute)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211 (Supp. 2002) (surrogacy statute)
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (living will statute)
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.705 (2001) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-103 to -105 (2001), amended by Act effective
Nov. 1, 2003, ch. 240, 2003 Mont. Laws RB 585 (living will statute)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-103 to -105 (2001), amended by Act effective
Nov. 1, 2003, ch. 240, 2003 Mont. Laws HB 585 (proxy statute)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (2001) amended by Act effective Nov. 1,
2003, ch. 240, 2003 Mont. Laws HB 585 (surrogacy statute)
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-404 to -406 (Michie 1999) (living will
statute)
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3401 to -3432 (Michie 2001) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 449.600-.610 (Michie 2000) (living will statute)
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 449.613, 449.800-.860 (Michie 2000) (proxy
statute)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 449.626 (Michie 2000) (surrogacy statute)
New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:3 to -:7 (1996) (living will statute)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-J:2 to -:6 (1996) (proxy statute)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:4 (Supp. 2002) (surrogacy statute)
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-56 to -59 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003) (living will
statute)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003) (proxy
statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
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New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-2 to -4 (Michie 2000) (living will statute)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-2 to -4 (Michie 2000) (proxy statute)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5 (Michie 2000) (surrogacy statute)
New York: (no living will statute)
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2981-2985 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2003)
(proxy statute)
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2003)
(surrogacy statute)
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Supp. 2002) (living will statute)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-17 to -22 (Supp. 2002) (proxy statute)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 2002) (surrogacy statute)
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-03 to -05 (2002) (living will statute)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-03 to -07 (2002) (proxy statute)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13 (2002) (surrogacy statute)
Ohio: OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.02-.06 (Anderson 2002) (living will
statute)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.12-.14 (Anderson 2002) (proxy statute)
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.08 (Anderson 2002) (surrogacy statute)
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.4-.6 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003)
(living will statute)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.4-.6 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003)
(proxy statute)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3080.4-.5 (West 1997 supp. 2003) (surrogacy
statute)
Oregon: OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.510-.545 (2001) (living will statute)
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.510-.545 (2001) (proxy statute)
OR. REv. STAT. § 127.635 (2001) (surrogacy statute)
Pennsylvania: PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § § 5404-5406 (West Supp. 2003) (living will
Rhode Island:
South Carolina:
South Dakota:
Tennessee:
Texas:
Utah:
statute)
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5404-5406, 5601-5605 (West Supp.
2003) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.11-3 to -4 (2001) (living will statute)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to -2 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-30 to -80 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (living will
statute)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-504 to -505 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002) (proxy
statute)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30 (Law. Co-op. 2002 & Supp. 2002)
(surrogacy statute)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12D-2 to -8 (Michie 1994) (living will statute)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 59-7-2.1 to -2.8 (Michie 1994) (proxy statute)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12C-3 (Michie 1994) (surrogacy statute)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-104 to -106 (2001) (living will statute)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-202 to -207 (2001) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.032-.051 (West 2001) (living
will statute)
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.152-.155 (West 2001) (proxy
statute)
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.035, 313.00.4 (West 2001)
(surrogacy statute)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1102 to -1111 (1993 & Supp. 2003) (living will
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The most difficult medical decisionmaking cases arise when the autonomy-based
paradigm favoring patient choice does not fit; that is, when a patient lacks autonomy or
has not exercised "precedent autonomy." 8 People with mental retardation, people with
severe mental disabilities, and children have never had decisionmaking capacity.
Others have had decisionmaking capacity at some time, but have lost it through
disease, accident, age, or injury. Although some people who lose their decisionmaking
statute)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1106 to -1111 (1993 & Supp. 2003) (proxy
statute)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105(2), 78-14-5(4) (1993 & Supp. 2003)
(surrogacy statute)
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5253-5257 (2000) (living will statute)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 14, §§ 3453-3467 (2002) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2983 to -2985 (Michie 2002) (living will statute)
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie 2002) (proxy statute)
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 2002) (surrogacy statute)
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.030-.040 (West 2002) (living will
statute)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.94.010-.046 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003)
(proxy statute)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003) (surrogacy
statute)
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30-4 to -18 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2002) (living
will statute)
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30-4 to -18 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2002) (proxy
statute)
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30-8 to -9 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2002)
(surrogacy statute)
Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ §154.03-.05 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002) (living will
statute)
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.05-.40 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002) (proxy statute)
(no surrogacy statute)
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-102 to -103 (Michie 2003) (living will statute)
Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-5-202 to -207 (Michie 2003) (proxy statute)
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-5-209, 35-22-105(b) (Michie 2003) (surrogacy
statute)
8. Leslie Pickering Francis, Decisionmaking at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer's
or Other Dementias, 35 GA. L. REV. 539, 551, 569-79 (2001), citing Ronald M. Dworkin,
Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK Q. 4, 10 (Supp. 2 1986). The autonomy-based
model for medical decisionmaking for patients who lack competence is subject to much
criticism. For example, Dean Boozang points out that
[tihe law's focus (perhaps a better word would be obsession) with personal
autonomy loses its force when the dying individual is incompetent, and her
wishes are unknown. The law's exclusive focus on personal autonomy
works great harm to the families of the dying by depriving them of
meaningful participation in the death of their loved one.
Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion in
Dying, 58 U. Prr. L. REv. 549, 550 (1997); see also John A. Robertson, Assessing Quality of
Life: A Response to Professor Kamisar, 25 GA. L. REv. 1243, 1243 (1991) ("Too many
commentators and policy makers have tried to fit the incompetent patient into the model of an
autonomous decisionmaker ...."); Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 1121, 1146 (1991).
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capacity have exercised their autonomy through some sort of advance directive or
appointment of a health care proxy, most have not. 9 Thus, for many people, the
decisionmaking model that relies on self-determination is inaccessible. Because the
concept of autonomy is so firmly entrenched in the modem paradigm for medical
decisionmaking, however, states have created surrogate decisionmaking mechanisms to
manufacture autonomy for people who lack decisionmaking capacity.10
Surrogacy statutes and case law in all fifty states give surrogates the ability to
make most health care decisions for patients who have never had decisionmaking
capacity or who lost their decisionmaking capacity without executing an advance
directive.' 1 Surrogate decisionmaking procedures work in essentially one of two ways.
9. One study shows only 10-25% of all people have executed an advance directive.
Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., Institutional Efforts to Promote Advance Care Planning in Nursing
Homes: Challenges and Opportunities, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHics, 150, 150 (1997). Another
shows that only 18% of Americans have executed an advance directive. Stanley S. Herr &
Barbara L. Hopkins, Health Care Decision-Making for Persons with Disabilities: An
Alternative to Guardianship, 271 JAMA 1017, 1017 (1994).
10. John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1991) ("The tendency to recast decisions
about incompetent patients as questions of prior autonomy, rather than to assess directly the
worth of the patient's life, is most evident when an incompetent patient has not issued a prior
directive to guide current decisions. Most courts faced with this question remain wedded to
personal autonomy and require that proxies determine what the patient, if competent, would
have decided about the choice before her.") (citing Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497
N.E.2d 626, 631-33 (Mass. 1986) (holding by means of substituted judgment); In re Spring, 405
N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980)). To be sure, some state legislatures and some courts have recognized
that a surrogacy statute does not give autonomy to a person who lacks competency. These
statutes were originally developed, however, to protect the autonomy and right to informed
consent of the incompetent.
11. The following statutes allow surrogates to make decisions without an advance
directive:
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (Supp. 2002); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231
(West 2003); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie 2000); California: CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §1418.8 (West 2000) & CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4711-4716 (West Supp. 2003);
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18.5-101 to -103 (1997 & Supp. 2002); Connecticut: CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (Supp. 2003); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507 (Supp. 2003);
D.C.: D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 to -2213 (2001); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.401,
765.404 (West Supp. 2003); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (2001); Hawaii: HAW. REv.
STAT. § 327E-5 (Supp. 2001); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 39-4303 (Michie 2002); Illinois: 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/20 (West Supp. 2003); Indiana: IND. CODE §§ 16-36-1-1 to -14 (1997 &
Supp. 2002); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West Supp. 2003); Kentucky: KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 311.631 (Michie 2001); Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.53 (West 2001);
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805 (West Supp. 2002); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-605 (2000 & Supp. 2002); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211
(Supp. 2002); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (2001) amended by Act effective Nov.
1, 2003, ch. 240, 2003 Mont. Laws HB 585; Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 449.626 (Michie
2000); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5 (Michie 2000); North Carolina: N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 2002); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-12-13 (2002); Ohio: OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08 (Anderson 2002); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3080.4-
.5; Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635 (2001); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30
(Law. Co-op. 2002 & Supp. 2002); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12C-3 (Michie
1994); Texas: TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.035, 313.00.4 (West 2001); Utah:
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105(2), 78-14-5(4) (1993 & Supp. 2003); Virginia: VA. CODEANN.
§ 54.1-2986 (Michie 2002); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065 (West 1992 &
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The surrogate is either asked to make the medical decision for the incompetent patient
based upon what is in the best interests of the patient,' 2 or to engage in the legal
fiction 13 of determining what the person would want if he or she were competent.'
4
Regardless of the standard that the surrogate must use to make decisions, most
state surrogacy laws allow a surrogate or guardian to make any and all decisions for a
patient who lacks capacity. In these states, surrogates can decide to terminate all
medical intervention including artificial respiration, nutrition, and hydration.'5 Some
states limit the authority of surrogates or guardians to make medical decisions for an
incompetent individual. Most of those limitations concern the termination of life-
sustaining treatment,' 6 and all are rooted in the inability to determine the incapacitated
patient's intent. As a result, some states preclude a surrogate from terminating life-
sustaining treatment without clear proof of the incapacitated person's intent. 17 When
those wishes are not known, or when there is no intent because the incapacitated
person lacks the ability to form it, the surrogate cannot choose to terminate treatment.
For example, New York, Arizona, 19 Michigan,
20 Missouri, 2' Ohio, 22 Mississippi, 23
Supp. 2003); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30-8 to -9 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2002);
Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-5-209, 35-22-105(b) (Michie 2003).
12. "Under the best interests test, a surrogate decisionmaker chooses for the incompetent
patient which medical procedures would be in the patient's best interest. The criteria used
include 'relief from suffering, preservation or restoration of functioning, and quality and extent
of sustained life."' In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292,299 (. 1990) (citing Rasmussen
v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987)); see also Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Cir. (In
re Guardianship of L.W.), 482 N.W.2d 60,75-76 (Wis. 1992) (applying the best interests test).
13. See Martin v. Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 407 (Mich. 1995); see also Deborah K.
McKnight & Maureen Bellis, Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment forAdult, Developmentally
Disabled, Public Wards: A Proposed Statute, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 223 (1992) ("[T]he
substituted judgment standard seeks to implement non-existent wishes .... ).
14. "The substituted judgment standard has subjective and objective components. Through
this standard, the surrogate attempts to ascertain, with as much specificity as possible, the
decision the incompetent patient would make if he were competent to do so." Martin, 538
N.W.2d at 407; see also Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 431-35 (Mass. 1977) (applying substituted judgment); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 757
(Md. 1993) (same); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 453-57 (N.J. 1987); In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448,
455 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting substituted judgment standard with respect to an infant because
an infant has no articulable judgment to be substituted, and stating that application of
substituted judgment necessitates that the patient had been competent at one time and had in
some manner expressed her preferences or values).
15. See Appendix (describing surrogacy and guardianship laws and their limitations in all
fifty states).
16. Some states place other limits on the types of decisions a surrogate can make. See, e.g.,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 625 (West Supp. 2003) (prohibiting surrogate from consenting to civil
commitment, electro-convulsive therapy, psycho-surgery, sterilization, or abortion); D.C. CODE
§ 21-2211 (2001) (prohibiting surrogate consent to abortion, sterilization, or psycho-surgery);
VA. CODE ANN § 54.1-2986 (Michie 2002) (prohibiting surrogate consent to non-therapeutic
sterilization, abortion, psychosurgery, or admission to a mental retardation facility).
17. E.g., Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 399; In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
18. N.Y. PuB. HEALTh LAW § 2965 (McKinney 1999) (limiting ability of surrogate to
consent to a DNR order); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750-b (McKinney Supp. 2003)
(allowing surrogate of person with mental retardation to terminate treatment); see also In re
Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 64.
19. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3231 (West 2003).
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Wisconsin, 24 and Hawaii25 limit to varying degrees the ability of certain surrogates to
choose to terminate life-sustaining treatment. In those states, certain caregivers and
surrogates may not make the decision to terminate life-sustaining nutrition and
hydration, even when the administration of nutrition and hydration has dire iatrogenic
effects. These states take a vitalist position for certain classes of patients: life must be
maintained whatever the cost to the patient, the families, and the caregivers.
Consistently, the states that maintain a vitalist position for some of their citizens claim
an unqualified interest in preserving life.26
As has been well documented elsewhere,27 the states' assertion in an unqualified
interest in life was validated by the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.28 Nancy Beth Cruzan was rendered
incompetent because of injuries sustained in an automobile accident.29 Her parents
20. See Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 399.
21. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425-26 (Mo. 1988).
22. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.08 (Anderson 1994).
23. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-215(9), 41-42-211 (Supp. 2002).
24. Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr. (In re Guardianship of L.W.), 482 N.W.2d 60,
88 (Wis. 1992).
25. HAW. REv. STAT. § 327E-5 (Supp. 2001).
26. See, e.g., Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 419 ("The state's concern with the sanctity of life
rests on the principle that life is precious and worthy of preservation without regard to its
quality."); People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296 (N.Y. 1984) ("This court will make no
judgment as to what is for another an unacceptable quality of life.").
27. See, e.g., George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeeringfrom Quinlan
and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 875 (1996); James Bopp Jr. & Daniel
Avila, The Due Process "Right to Life" in Cruzan and Its Impact on "Right-to-Die" Law, 53 U.
PITT. L. REv. 193 (1991); Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A
Physician's Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241 (1993); John M. Finnis, The
"Value of Human Life" and "The Right to Death": Some Reflections on Cruzan and Ronald
Dworkin, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 559 (1993); M. Rose Gasner, The Unconstitutional Treatment of
Nancy Cruzan, 7 N.Y. L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 1 (1990); Lawrence 0. Gostin, A Line Between
Killing and Letting Die: The Law, and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J.L. MED.
& ETHics 94 (1993); Edward R. Grant & Cathleen A. Cleaver, A Line Less Reasonable: Cruzan
and the Looming Debate over Active Euthanasia, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuES 99 (1991);
Mark E. Haddad, Cruzan and the Demands of Due Process, 8 Issus L. & MED. 205 (1992);
Harvard Law Review Association, Right to Die -Incompetents' Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment, 104 HARV. L. REv. 257 (1990); James H. Lawlor III, The Right to Die in
Illinois in the Wake of Cruzan, Longway, and Greenspan, 79 ILL. B.J. 72 (1991); Susan R.
Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Coming to Terms with Death: The Cruzan Case, 42 HAsTiNGS
L.J. 817 (1991); Dorothy J. McNoble, The Cruzan Decision-A Surgeon's Perspective, 20 U.
MEM. L. REv. 569 (1990); Martha L. Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991
UTAH L. REv. 1 (1991); Thomas J. Orusko & Patricia Casey Cuthbertson, The Right to Refuse
Medical Treatment in Ohio after Cruzan: The Need for a Comprehensive Legislative Solution, 5
J.L. & HEALTH 35 (1990/199 1); Philip G. Peters Jr., The State's Interest in the Preservation of
Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891 (1989); John J. Regan, Refusing Life-
Sustaining Treatment for Incompetent Patients: New York's Response to Cruzan, 19 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 341 (1991/1992); Robertson, supra note 10; Cindy Hylton Rushton &
Elizabeth E. Hogue, The Role of Families as Surrogate Decisionmakers after Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 219 (1991);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Pedigrees of Rights and Powers in Scalia's Cruzan Concurrence,
56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 283 (1994).
28. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
29. Id. at 265.
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sought a court order directing the withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration,
which all agreed would cause her death. The Supreme Court of Missouri "held that
because there was no clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's desire to have
life-sustaining treatment withdrawn under such circumstances, her parents lacked
authority to effectuate such a request." 3 ' The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to
consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution
which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under
these circumstances.,, 32 The Court held that she did not.
33
The Cruzan Court "assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition." 34 The Court declined, however, to decide whether an incompetent individual
has a similar liberty interest, stating:
The difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it begs the question:
An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary
choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other
right. Such a 'right' must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of
surrogate.
35
The Court further explained that even were such a liberty interest possessed, whether
the individual's "constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. 36
The Court found that the interests motivating Missouri were significant to all
states:
As a general matter, the States-indeed, all civilized nations--demonstrate
their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime.
Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing
criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do
not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed
and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death.3
7
The Court explained that states' interests in preserving life are particularly acute in
withdrawal of treatment cases because "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality." 38 Thus, "a State may
properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular
individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life."39
Significantly, the Court rejected the argument that a state "must accept the
30. Id. at 267-68.
31. Id. at 265.
32. Id. at 269.
33. See generally id.
34. Id. at 279.
35. Id. at 280.
36. Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
37. Id. at 280.
38. Id. at 281.
39. Id.; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730 (1997) ("This remains true,
as Cruzan makes clear, even for those who are near death.").
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'substituted judgment' of close family members even in the absence of substantial
proof that their views reflect the views of the patient."4° The Court refused to hold that
the Due Process Clause requires the state to repose judgment on what is an acceptable
quality of life with anyone but the patient herself. According to the Court, even the best
intended family members cannot guarantee that their view is the same as the patient's
would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation while
competent. 4'
Accordingly, the Court held that the state was not "required by the United States
Constitution to repose a right of 'substituted judgment' with anyone .... ,,42 In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor wrote that, under the Court's decision, the task of
crafting procedures in this context was "entrusted to the laboratory of the States .... 'A3
Notably, the Cruzan Court discussed the then-controlling New York law44 as an
example of what was constitutionally permissible,45 discussing among other cases In re
Storar.46 Mr. Storar was a profoundly retarded man with terminal bladder cancer who
"was always totally incapable of understanding or making a reasoned decision about
medical treatment. 'A 7 His treating physicians recommended the blood transfusions,
which could "eliminate the risk of death from [a] treatable cause," and which would
maintain the patient's physical and mental condition at their "usual level., 48 Although
the patient's mother opposed the transfusions, she seemed not to understand the
consequences of stopping them, including whether it might cause him to die sooner. 49
The mother "testified that she wanted the transfusions discontinued because she only
wanted her son to be comfortable.,5 0 The hospital sought an order to administer the
treatment. New York's highest court granted the hospital that order.
5 1
The New York Court of Appeals explained that "[mlentally John Storar was an
infant" and that the standard applicable to decisionmaking for minors was the "only
realistic way to assess his rights. 5 2 The court explained that while a parent or guardian
has a right to consent to an infant's medical treatment, a parent "may not deprive a
child of life saving treatment, however well intentioned. It stated that "[elven when
the parents' decision to decline necessary treatment is based on constitutional grounds,
such as religious beliefs, it must yield to the State's interests, as parens patriae, in
protecting the health and welfare of the child."5 4 The court noted that "the transfusions
were analogous to food-they would not cure the cancer, but they could eliminate the
40. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285-86.
41. Id. at 286.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation omitted).
44. On September 17, 2002, "Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental
Retardation" became law in New York. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW §§ 1750, 1750-b
(McKinney Supp. 2003). The law permits the guardian of a mentally retarded person to decide
to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment under specified circumstances. See infra Part
ll.
45. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271-75.
46. 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id. at 73.
49. Id. at 70.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 74.
52. Id. at 73.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id. (citations omitted).
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risk of death from another treatable cause."" Thus, the court ordered the transfusions
because it would not "allow an incompetent patient to bleed to death because someone,
even someone as close as a parent or sibling, feels that this is best for one with an
incurable disease.
56
The Cruzan Court also discussed In re Westchester County Medical Center on
Behalf of O'Connor,57 where the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the right to decline
life-sustaining treatment, arising from the doctrine of informed consent, "is personal
and, under existing law in [New York], could not be exercised by a third party when
the patient is unable to do so.",58 The O'Connor Court explicitly rejected a "substituted
judgment" approach that would permit a third party to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, even where the patient could not, or did not ever express his or her views in
a clearly convincing fashion. The court held that the substituted judgment "approach
remains unacceptable because it is inconsistent with our fundamental commitment to
the notion that no person or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be
an acceptable quality of ie for another,"59 and that "if an error occurs it should be
made on the side of life.
'
Thus, the Cruzan Court gave states the permission to take a vitalist position in the
absence of an exercise of autonomy by the patient him or herself and condoned New
York's law, which had done just that. Based on Cruzan, the states are free to require
that incompetent patients receive life-sustaining treatment. Ten years after Cruzan was
decided, and nineteen after Storar, a New York woman suffered the terrible
consequences of those decisions.
II. THE TRAGIC CASE OF SHEILA POULIOT
Ms. Pouliot['s] ... family, guardian and physicians... are clearly acting
in what they believe to be Ms. Pouliot's best interests and on the basis of
reasonable medical judgment. We do not appear in this case to prolong the
anguish of Ms. Pouliot or her family. We are here because New York law
does not appear to permit anyone-a family, a guardian, even a court-to
prevent a person like Ms. Pouliot, who has never been competent to
express a desire to forgo life-sustaining treatment, from receiving nutrition
and hydration.
6 1
A. An Epoch Death
Sheila Pouliot was a terminally ill and profoundly retarded forty-two-year-old
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also In re Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 82 (N.Y. 1990) ("[W]here the
patient [in Storar] was incapable ever of making such a choice because of retardation ... we
ordered that medical care continue."). The court noted that there was convincing evidence that
the transfusions did not involve excessive pain, and expressly left open the question of the
appropriate result if a life-sustaining treatment did involve excessive pain. Storar, 420 N.E.2d at
73.
57. 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
58. Id. at 612 (citing People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984)).
59. Id. at 613 (citing Eulo) (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Vacatur of Stay, In re Pouliot v.
Marzella, to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, Fourth Department No.
99-7835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000) (on file with author).
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woman when she was admitted to University Hospital at the State University of New
York in Syracuse on December 21, 1999.62 She had suffered complications from the
mumps as an infant that left her severely disabled. 63 The mumps caused Olivo-Pontine-
Cerebellar degeneration and partial blindness.64 Ms. Pouliot was unable to speak, read,
walk, or eat. She communicated pain by groaning and suffered flexion contractures in
all four limbs.65 She was fed through a gastrostomy tube ("G tube"). Ms. Pouliot's
parents and sister took care of her at home until she was twenty years old, at which
time she was moved to a state-run group home. Her mother visited frequently until she
became debilitated by Alzheimer's disease. Ms. Pouliot's sister, Alice Blouin, became
her primary caregiver and visited Ms. Pouliot regularly. During the course of Ms.
Pouliot's last stay in the hospital, Ms. Blouin kept a regular vigil at Ms. Pouliot's
bedside.
66
Ms. Pouliot was admitted to the hospital in December 1999 with bleeding in her
gastrointestinal tract and what was initially diagnosed as aspiration pneumonia.67
Because of the bleeding, Ms. Pouliot could not tolerate feeding through the G tube.68
She "had an 'acute' abdomen, manifested by generalized, severe, abdominal pain and a
nonfunctioning intestine." 69 The physicians who examined Ms. Pouliot advised her
family that she was suffering from what was likely to be her terminal illness, that she
was in pain, and that further treatment would likely prolong the suffering. 70
After meetings with the treating physicians, the University Hospital's Ethics
Committee, and clergy to discuss her medical treatment, Ms. Pouliot's family members
asked her treating physicians to withhold all treatment, including nutrition, hydration,
and antibiotics. 7' Initially, her physicians complied with the request. The family and
physicians agreed that only palliative treatment would be maintained because any
additional treatment would prolong Ms. Pouliot's suffering.72
62. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
63. Kathy Faber-Langendoen, Sheila Pouliot's Story, at http://www.familydecisions.org/
pouliot (last visited Sept. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Faber-Langendoen].
64. Id.
65. Contractures are "[a] condition of fixed high resistance to passive stretch of a muscle,
resulting from fibrosis of the tissues supporting the muscles or the joints, or from disorders of
the muscle fibers." RICHARD SLOANE, THE SLOAN-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL LEGAL
DICTIONARY 164 (1987).
66. Aff. of Kathleen McGrail, M.D., Joint Appendix on Appeal at 1647-48, Blouin v.
Spitzer, No. 02-7997 (2d Cir. docketed Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter McGrail aff.].
67. Blouin v. Spitzer, 01-CV-0925 HGM/GJD, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18243, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. November 5,2001). In his brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Attorney General Eliot Spitzer argues that the medical records do not support a finding
that Ms. Pouliot suffered from pneumonia at the time she was admitted to the hospital. See Brief
for Appellees, Blouin v. Spitzer, No. 02-7997 (2d Cir. docketed Mar. 5, 2003). In addition to
the bleeding, Ms. Pouliot suffered "osteoporosis (thinning of the bones), with associate fractures
in her right humerus and pelvis; dislocation of her left hip as well as possibly of her right
shoulder; widespread flexion contractures involving elbows, knees and hips; and a seizure
disorder." McGrail aff., supra note 65, at 1639.
68. Faber-Langendoen, supra note 63.
69. McGrail aff., supra note 65, at 1639.
70. Id.
71. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
72. As defined by the World Health Organization, palliative care is:
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On December 27, 1999, however, the University Hospital administration learned
that the treating physician had not administered nutrition or antibiotics to Ms. Pouliot
and, after consultation with the State Office of Mental Retardation and Development
Disabilities ("OMRDD"), determined that under New York law,73 Ms. Pouliot should
be provided nutrition, hydration, and antibiotics.
On December 30, after learning that the treating physician had not provided all the
required care,74 the hospital petitioned the state trial court to appoint a guardian ad
litem for Sheila Pouliot. The court appointed a guardian, who petitioned the court to
terminate all nutrition and hydration.75 The trial judge held a hearing at the hospital on
December 30, 1999.
During the hearing, the treating physicians informed the court that there is
a 14-day period during which is it medically appropriate to withhold
nutrition and that it was their intention to do so while continually assessing
Ms. Pouliot's readiness to receive nutrition. The treating physicians also
testified that further treatment to provide nutrition to Ms. Pouliot would
result in prolonging her agony without any significant health or medical
benefits.
76
On January 3, 2000, the trial judge issued an order that all medical treatment for Ms.
Pouliot be terminated, except for nutrition, as tolerated, and palliative hydration care.
77
The next day, the guardian ad litem and plaintiff commenced an Article 78
proceeding and petitioned the Supreme Court of New York to enjoin permanently the
State of New York, its agents, officers, and/or employees from further medical
intervention, nutritional sustenance, or other life-sustaining treatment for Ms. Pouliot.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge temporarily enjoined the named
respondents from providing any medical intervention with regard to nutritional
sustenance.
78
Ms. Pouliot received hydration only until January 7. Then, after the trial judge was
[T]he total active care of patients whose disease is not responsive to
curative treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms and of
psychological, social and spiritual problems is paramount. The goal of
palliative care is achievement of the best possible quality of life for
patients and their families.... Palliative Care: affirms life and regards
dying as a normal process; neither hastens nor postpones death; provides
relief from pain and other distressing symptoms; integrates the
psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care; offers a support system
to help patients live as actively as possible until death; offers a support
system to help the family cope during the patient's illness and their own
bereavement.
David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician-Assisted Suicide After Glucksberg/Quill, 9
ALB. L. J. Sci. & TECH. 161, 225 n.346 (1999), quoting WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND PALLIATIVE CARE, TECHNIcAL REPORT SERIES 804, at 11 (1989).
73. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re
Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
74. Blouin v. Spitzer, 01-CV-0925 HGM/GJD, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18243, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. November 5, 2001).
75. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 187.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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made aware of the limitations in New York law, the family, guardian, and hospital
attorneys agreed to provide Ms. Pouliot hydration and to attempt to provide 900
calories of nutrition, which was an amount sufficient to maintain life.79 The court
ordered the continuing provision of artificial nutrition and hydration. s°
Doctors made efforts to provide Ms. Pouliot with the planned 900 calories a day.s'
The attempt caused projectile vomiting and intractable hiccups. 82 As a result, doctors
were able to provide only about 300 calories a day through intravenous ("IV") fluids,83
consisting essentially of sugar water. 84 The calories provided contained no protein.
The long-term provision of calories in the absence of protein causes more
problems than it solves. The nutrition contained in the fluids-consisting only of
glucose-is sufficient to maintain life (heart and lung function). But it cannot prevent
protein starvation. In fact, there is universal medical agreement that the prolonged
provision of calories in the absence of the ability to provide protein is inappropriate
medical care. 5 Despite their agreement that it was not appropriate medical care, the
doctors gave Ms. Pouliot the 300 calories a day for two and a half months because of
the court order.
During that time, Ms. Pouliot's body began to catabolize her own tissue. The
hydration provided through the IV tubes damaged her organs and caused her severe
pain. Further, it caused her severe edema, which stretched her skin to the point where it
fell off and left raw painful areas.86 She was in agony. She spent the next two months
moaning and curled in the fetal position.
Despite aggressive efforts to control her symptoms, such control was not
achieved and the principle of safe and comfortable dying was violated. All
observers agreed she had significant and excessive pain, manifested by
moaning and crying, by furrowing her forehead and by flexing her
extremities. These symptoms occurred despite the fact that she was on the
equivalent of approximately 5000 mg of oral morphine a day. She could
sometimes be partially consoled by stroking her forehead or placing a
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Faber-Langendoen progress note, supra note 1.
83. David F. Lehmann, M.D., progress note entered into Sheila Pouliot's medical chart
(Feb. 29, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lehmann progress note].
84. Faber-Langendoen progress note, supra note 1.
85. [L]oss of appetite and poor function of the gut with reflux and constipation
mark the final stage of... illness, as occurred to Sheila. When forced to
eat or pushed to eat against their will or if fed through a feeding tube, these
patients often display reflux and aspiration and sometimes vomiting. The
muscles for swallowing also weaken, making swallowing difficult, leading
to painful and frightening choking, even on one's oral secretions.... This
protective synergy is totally countermanded when intravenous fluid or
hyperalimentation is given .... Dying is easier and less distressing when
we do not give fluids by artificial means.
McGrail aff., supra note 65, at 1644-45.
86. During that time, Ms. Pouliot' s skin broke down with "excessive maceration," she was
"edemous, with total body bloating from hydration in the absence of protein. Hydration alone.
. . resulted in severe protein malnutrition, which is typified by skin, peripheral muscle, and
cardiac muscle breakdown." Faber-Langendoen progress note, supra note 1.
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musical angel next to her head on her pillow.
87
On February 29, 2000, more than two months after Ms. Pouliot entered the hospital,
one of her treating physicians entered the following progress note in her chart:
[T]he intravenous fluids promote that the patient is kept alive for her own
body to consume/eat itself. . .. [T]his current plan of IV hydration
promotes an increase in patient suffering, does not promote life quality,
and maintains her heart/lung capacity only-and, indeed, therefore this
current tact is outside of acceptable medical bounds, in effect worsening
her condition, since she is consuming herself calorically. It is thus, not
medically indicated.
88
Another of Ms. Pouliot's physicians stated in a consultation note, "Sheila is edematous,
with total body bloating from hydration in the absence of protein. Hydration... has
resulted in severe... cardiac muscle breakdown. She will die a slow lingering death
from protein malnutrition." 89 The treating physician also noted that the provision of
artificial hydration ordered by the Court was "inhumane and is causing suffering ....
From a medical standpoint, it is outside the bounds of... medically indicated care."
9
Finally, the guardian decided to take action. He went back to court seeking an
order that would allow the physicians to withdraw the IV fluids. 91 At the hearing, Ms.
Pouliot's physicians testified that Ms. Pouliot was essentially a living corpse. "[T]he
continuation of hydration for this patient is affirmatively causing significant physical
harm to the patient in that it is bringing about unnatural and painful decomposition of
her body tissues .... Further treatment would cause affirmative harm by prolonging
her suffering, adding to her pain, and causing her organs, including her skin to break
down further. Terminating nutrition and hydration would lessen her pain.
But it would also cause her death. Ms. Pouliot's life expectancy was
approximately two to four months if hydration was continued.93 She would die within
three to fourteen days if hydration was discontinued.94 Thus, the treatment that was
harming Ms. Pouliot was technically "life sustaining." As discussed below, 95 New
York law prohibited a third party, even a court appointed guardian or loving family
member, from making the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment for another
person.
96
After visiting Sheila Pouliot's bedside, the Supreme Court judge issued an order to
87. McGrail aff., supra note 65, at 1646 (emphasis added).
88. Lehmann progress note, supra note 81 (emphasis in original).
89. Faber-Langendoen progress note, supra note 1.
90. Id. at 409.
91. See Joint Appendix on Appeal at 409, Blouin v. Spitzer, No. 02-7997 (2d Cir. docketed
Mar. 5, 2003).
92. Aff. of Kathy Faber-Langendoen, M.D., Joint Appendix on Appeal at 797, Blouin v.
Spitzer, No. 02-7997 (2d Cir. docketed Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Faber-Langendoen aff.].
93. Id. at 796.
94. Id. at 797.
95. See infra Part III.
96. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184,193 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("New York law does not
allow a third party to decide that the quality of life of another has declined to a point where
treatment should be withheld and the patient should be allowed to die."); In re Westchester
County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) ("[N]o person or court
should substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another.").
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terminate all nutrition and hydration. He acknowledged that New York law did not
allow his order, but he explained: 'There's the law, and there's what's right., 97 The
hospital and OMRDD appealed seeking firmer legal ground for their actions or
inactions. In the brief filed on their behalf, the Attorney General's office took an
unusual position. Instead of acting as an adversary, it recognized the moral and legal
problems with the apparent state of the law and asked the appellate court to tell the
parties what to do.98
The appeal invoked a statutory provision that automatically stayed the judge's
order. That day, the physician wrote in the hospital chart that the nutrition and
hydration were causing "grotesque harm" to Ms. Pouliot.99 On March 3, 2000, ajudge
of the Appellate Division granted an order to vacate the stay until a hearing before the
full panel could be held on March 7, 2000.1°° Nutrition and hydration were terminated
on March 3.I °1 Ms. Pouliot died on March 6, 2000, just before the full court was to
hear oral argument. The Attorney General withdrew the appeal. No written precedent
resulted from the case.
B. Aftermath: Blouin v. Spitzer and the Health Care Decisions Act for Mentally
Retarded Persons
There have been two important developments since Ms. Pouliot's death:
legislation and a lawsuit. First, after much publicity and advocacy by Sheila Pouliot's
supporters, 102 the state enacted the "Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental
Retardation," which was signed into law by Governor George Pataki on September 17,
2002.103 The statute now permits the guardian of a mentally retarded person to decide
to withhold life-sustaining treatment, including nutrition and hydration, where "[t]here
is no reasonable hope of maintaining life" or "[t]he artificially provided nutrition or
hydration poses an extraordinary burden."'
1 4
The Health Care Decisions Act is an important, but limited, development in New
York law. For the first time, a surrogate can make the decision to terminate life-
sustaining treatment for a person who lacks competence. The act is very restrictive
however.1 5 As its name implies, it applies only to those people certified by physicians
to suffer from mental retardation. Thus, it would have helped Sheila Pouliot, but not a
terminally ill child or person with brain damage or mental illness. 106 Nor would it have
97. Michael D. Goldhaber, The Law v. What's Right, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 2000, at Al.
98. See generally Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Vacatur of Stay, In re
Pouliot v. Marzella No. 99-7835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000) (on file with author).
99. Joint Appendix on Appeal at 960, Blouin v. Spitzer, No. 02-7997 (2d Cir. docketed
Mar. 5, 2003).
100. Id. at 790.
101. Id. at 964.
102. See http://www.familydecisions.org/sheila.html (collecting newspaper accounts of the
Pouliot case) (last visited Sept. 14, 2003).
103. 2002 N.Y. Laws, ch. 500, codified at N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1750, 1750-b
(McKinney 2003).
104. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AT §1750-b (McKinney 2003).
105. Ben Golden, New Law Gives Guardians Authority to End Futile TreatmentforAdults
with Retardation, 75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 16 (2003).
106. A bill proposing a law that would allow the families or other surrogates of all
incompetent patients to terminate life-sustaining treatment has been introduced and rejected by
the New York State Senate every year for the past several years. See www.fanilydecisions.org
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helped Mary O'Connor'0 7 or similar patients, who once had competency, but lost it.
The second important development since Ms. Pouliot's death is a lawsuit filed by
Ms. Pouliot's family against New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Assistant
Attorney General Win Thurlow, who handled the Pouliot case in the trial court, the
New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, and the
University Hospital/SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse. 10 This litigation has
the potential to bring even more sweeping changes for the incompetent than the limited
legislation passed by New York.
The lawsuit alleges that the defendants violated Ms. Pouliot's rights under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 109 It also
raises claims of negligence, unlawful practice of medicine, battery, and intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional and mental distress and anguish.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they are entitled
to absolute and qualified immunity for their actions taken in their official capacities." , 0
The district court first held that the defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity
because they did not act in a traditional prosecutor's role in pursuing the case."'1 The
court went on to hold, however, that the defendants were entitled to qualified
(last visited Sept. 14, 2003) (detailing history of the movement to get broad legislation passed).
107. In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 420 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
108. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). Ms. Blouin apparently
dropped the suit against the office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, the
University Hospital/SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse, and the various John and Jane
Does. Those defendants were never served with the complaint.
109. Id. at 187. The complaint also alleged violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments,
but those allegations were abandoned in the trial court. Id. at 188.
110. Id. at 189.
111. Id. The Supreme Court has granted absolute immunity to officials who "perform
,special functions' which, because of their similarity to functions that would have been immune
when Congress enacted § 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages liability." Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1993). As a result, absolute immunity from damages
liability "has been accorded to a few types of government officials whose duties are deemed as a
matter of public policy to require such protection to enable them to function independently and
effectively, without fear or harassment." Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir.
1986). In determining whether actions are deserving of absolute immunity, the Supreme Court
has applied a "functional approach," Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269, which looks to "the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 229 (1988).
Under this analysis, "prosecutors sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled to absolute
immunity from claims for damages arising out of duties that are intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process." Parkinson v. Cozzolino, 238 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir.
2001) (internal quotation omitted); see also Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1987)
(acts of Attorney General and deputy prosecutors in instigating criminal contempt proceedings
protected by absolute immunity). This absolute immunity "also extends to 'acts undertaken by a
prosecutor in preparing for the initiation ofjudicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in
the course of his role as an advocate for the State."' Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1998) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). However, "[a] prosecutor's administrative duties and
those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of
a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity." Buckley, 509
U.S. at 273. Thus, the "ultimate question" is whether the officials "were functioning as
'advocates' when they engaged in the challenged conduct." Parkinson, 238 F.2d at 150 (internal
quotation omitted).
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immunity.' 1 2 Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for
damages allegedly arising from the performance of discretionary official functions
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."" 3 In the Pouliot family
lawsuit, the district court held that Sheila Pouliot's rights were not violated, and even if
they were, they were not clearly established. New York law, said the court, clearly
"does not allow a third party to decide that the quality of life of another has declined to
a point where treatment should be withheld and the patient should be allowed to
die."1 4 Thus, said the court, the defendants' actions were objectively reasonable and
not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Nor did they violate her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Relying on
Cruzan and its endorsement of New York's clear and convincing evidence of specific
subjective intent standard, the court held that New York's laws simply act to protect
life, and that the state attorney general acted reasonably in enforcing them."
5
Moreover, said the court, "defendant's actions were objectively reasonable given the
state of the law in New York and cannot be described as 'shocking the conscience."" 1 6
The court further held that plaintiff had failed to allege any cognizable equal
protection violation. Ms. Pouliot's family had based its equal protection claim on four
assertions:
A. Patients in palliative care like Ms. Pouliot are treated differently from
those who are mentally competent and receiving palliative care.
B. The State of New York and defendants permitted surrogate decision-
making panels to operate in Albany and New York City, but not in
Central and Western New York, which resulted in unequal treatment
for mentally disabled individuals within the State of New York.
C. Defendant Spitzer handled the issue of medical consent differently in
different parts of the State of New York.
D. The differentiation in New York law between a DNR order and other
decisions pertaining to life support is so arbitrary that it denies equal
protection. 17
The court rejected the initial claim holding that "New York's distinction between
competent and incompetent individuals is rationally related to the legitimate state
interests of preserving life."' 1 8 The second claim, said the court, is without merit
because no decisionmaking panel in New York was authorized to discontinue life-
112. A qualified immunity defense is established where "(a) the defendant's action did not
violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe
that his action did not violate such law." Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 133 (2d Cir. 2002). The
"concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to
the legal constraints on particular [official] conduct .... If the officer's mistake as to what the
law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to" immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 205 (2001). Thus, the doctrine ".gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by
protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986)).
113. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d. at 190.
114. Id. at 193.
115. Id. at 194.
116. Id. at 194-95.
117. Id. at 195.
118. Id. at 196.
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sustaining treatment. 19 The third claim failed because the two cases handled by
Spitzer's office involved completely different factual scenarios, one dental treatment
and the other a life or death decision.' 20 The court's rejection of the final equal
protection argument may be the most tenuous conclusion in the case. Ms. Blouin
argued that
suffering patients like Ms. Pouliot have just as strong an interest in
avoiding other forms of support as they do in avoiding cardiopulmonary
resuscitation and to the extent the state has an interest in averting quality
of life determinations by surrogates, its interest is just as applicable to
DNR orders as it is to other forms of medical intervention.
1 2 1
The court disagreed, stating with no support or explanation that the decision to sign a
DNR order "and the decision to cause death by the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment are not comparable. These decisions are faced by individuals that are not
similarly circumstanced, so the differentiation in treatment does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause."'22 Finally, the court rejected each of the pendant state law claims
as without merit.
Ms. Pouliot's family appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. The court heard oral argument on March 5, 2003.
11. VITALISM IN THE LAW: How SHEILA POULIOT'S TRAGEDY COULD BE REPEATED
IN STATES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
Sheila Pouliot was a victim of vitalism run amuck. The principle of vitalism "holds
that the preservation of individual human life is an end in itself, irrespective of the
social, economic, or personal cost. The vitalist aggressively defends human biological
existence."'123 To the vitalist, life is "an intrinsic good, irrespective of whether it is of
value to its possessor."' 124 "Life is so sacred . . . [that all] customary medical
procedures to prolong or save a life must be used."' 125 All vitalists would agree that
"medical treatment chosen for an otherwise healthy person must also be chosen for one
with physical and mental handicaps, however severe."'
126
The commitment to vitalist principles runs along a continuum. 127 "[T]he more
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Laurence 0. Gostin, A Moment in Human Development: Legal Protection, Ethical
Standards and Social Policy on the Selective Non-Treatment of Handicapped Neonates, 11 AM.
J.L. & MED. 31, 37 (1985).
124. Boozang, supra note 8, at 568.
125. Gostin, supra note 123, at 37.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. Gostin defines a continuum of vitalist thought, from the most robust or pure (requiring
all heroic or extraordinary measures) to the more moderate which "recognizes that decisions
affecting individual human life are already made as a consequence of allocating scarce health
care resources." Gostin, supra note 123, at 37. Philosopher Helga Kuhse argues that to qualify
vitalism in any way is logically inconsistent because it infringes upon the absolute prohibition
on the intentional termination of life and requires consideration of quality of life. See generally
HELGA KUHSE, THE SANCTITY-OF-LIFE DOCTRINE IN MEDICINE: A CRrIQUE (1987). She submits
that it is inconsistent to say that all lives are equally valuable while at the same time allowing
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extreme sanctity-of-life adherents view non-treatment as intentional termination of life,
which is prohibited. Consequently, they would mandate continued treatment in every
instance, irrespective of the patient's condition."'  Moderate vitalists recognize that
"there is no logical rationale for providing extraordinary treatment for handicapped
[persons] when the same treatment would not customarily be used for patients with
comparable medical needs."' 29 Thus, some vitalists suggest that letting certain patients
die is justifiable, at least when prolonging life is merely prolonging the dying
process.'
30
New York's laws that prohibited Sheila Pouliot's family from choosing the
medically indicated course of terminating nutrition and hydration reflected extreme
vitalist policy. Most states take a different approach. They allow surrogates to make
medical decisions based in part on the quality of life of the patient.' 3' But vitalism is
alive and well in a minority of states. The minority states limit to varying degrees the
ability of certain surrogates to make decisions to terminate treatment that is sustaining
life. Vitalism requires continued life-sustaining treatment for virtually all incompetent
patients who have not executed advance directives in New York, Missouri, and
Michigan. In Arizona, Wisconsin, Ohio, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Utah,
statutes or case law place specific limitations on the ability of certain surrogates to
terminate artificial nutrition and hydration for certain incompetent patients.'
32
Each of the laws that prohibits surrogates from terminating treatment leaves
various groups of incompetent people vulnerable to the same painful, lingering death
suffered by Sheila Pouliot. This Part of the Article will explore the limitations that
states place on surrogate decisionmakers for incompetent patients to expose the
situations in which the Pouliot scenario could be repeated.
A. New York
Until this year, when New York took a small step back from its extreme vitalist
position in the wake of Sheila Pouliot's death, 133 New York law was the paradigm of
the withholding of treatment from certain patients. Id. at 5.
128. Boozang, supra note 8, at 568.
129. Gostin, supra note 123, at 37.
130. Boozang, supra note 8, at 568, citing Paul Ramsey, who argues in favor of a medical
indications policy. According to Ramsey, caregivers need not attempt curative treatments that
are not medically indicated for the dying. Curative treatments that merely prolong the dying
process, says Ramsey, are not ethically required; caregivers should focus on care rather than on
the cure of the dying. Id. Interestingly, Ramsey's position and that of other more moderate
vitalists is that adopted in the position paper of the Catholic Bishops. National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections, 15 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455 (1999).
131. All states that allow surrogates to use the best interests standard allow surrogates to
consider quality of life. Boozang, supra note 8, at 572.
132. Kathleen Boozang argues that all states using a substituted judgment test "essentially
adopt a sanctity of life jurisprudence .... Unless explicit patient instructions exist to terminate
treatment, these states prioritize the state's interest in the sanctity of life, rejecting entirely or
according comparatively insignificant weight to other factors." Boozang, supra note 8, at 578-
79. Boozang's thesis is proving itself in Terry Schiavo's case in Florida. There, because
Schiavo's wishes were not documented in writing, a vitalist governor, Jeb Bush, and the Florida
legislature have forced life despite court findings that Schiavo herself would decline treatment
in her current condition.
133. Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retardation. N.Y. SURR. CT.
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extreme vitalism. Now, New York's protection of life yields to the express exercise of
autonomy,' 34 in cases involving cardio-pulmonary resuscitation,135 and for people with
mental retardation. In all other cases, the general rule requiring treatment applies.
New York's general rule is well-grounded in both common and statutory law.
Under common law, a "patient alone had the right to decide on terminating life support
systems." 136 Consistent with the personal nature of this right, the Court of Appeals has
expressed a "fundamental commitment to the notion that no person or court should
substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another."' 137
Thus, a third party may not decide to terminate life-sustaining sustenance for a
person who has not stated a "specific subjective intent"' 138 to forgo such treatment
under the circumstances presented. 139 The requirement that the patient have expressed
a specific subjective intent is so strict that it is almost never satisfied absent a written
directive. 140
Of course, certain patients have never had the ability to express a specific
subjective intent. As to them, New York law requires that all life-sustaining treatment
be provided. The rule applies with particular force to nutrition and hydration. Parents
and guardians "cannot and should not be permitted to make a decision that would
result in [the incompetent patient] starving to death, if such could be medically
avoided, regardless of how soon he may or may not succumb from other causes."' 41
New York's policy prohibiting third-party decisions to withhold life-sustaining
treatment where the patient's wishes are not known or knowable is reflected in statute.
In 1985, the legislature enacted Mental Hygiene Law Article 80, providing for
"surrogate decision-making committees" to make health care decisions for incompetent
residents of mental hygiene facilities who need "major medical treatment" and do not
have family members, guardians, committees or conservators available to make those
decisions. 142 The types of "major medical treatment" within a committee's purview
were explicitly defined to exclude "nutrition or... the withdrawal or discontinuance of
medical treatment which is sustaining life functions."' 143
Subsequent statutes changed little. In 1990, the legislature passed New York's first
PROC. ACT § 1750(b) (McKinney 2003).
134. In re Estate of Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 537-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
135. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2963 (McKinney 2002).
136. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. 1993).
137. In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y.
1988).
138. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., The Role of the Judge in Medical Treatment Decisions, 57
ALB. L. REv. 647, 652 (1994) (citing O'Connor).
139. See In re Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d 373, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("It further
follows that a medical recommendation to effectively deny sustenance to a starving patient
would be unreasonable on its face."), leave denied, 678 N.E.2d 501 (1997).
140. See O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613 (holding that patient's statements that she would
not want to live like a vegetable or be a burden to her family made after watching a relative die
of cancer were insufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard).
141. Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 377. Although the Matthews court upheld the parents'
decision to decline aggressive treatment of their retarded son based on their family doctor's
recommendation to pursue another effective course of therapy, the court stated it would have
reached a different conclusion had the proof been that the patient "was being deprived of life-
sustaining treatment." Id.
142. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 80.03, 80.07 (McKinney 1996).
143. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.03(a) (McKinney 1996).
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health care proxy statute, permitting a competent individual to designate an agent who
could "make any and all health care decisions on the principal's behalf that the
principal could make."' 44 Even under this scheme, however, the state maintained its
policy against withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration where the patient's
views were not known. The statute provides that "if the principal's wishes regarding
the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration are not reasonably known and
cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, the agent shall not have the authority
to make decisions regarding these measures."'
' 45
In 1992, the legislature enacted a new, comprehensive guardianship scheme, 46 but
that statute still did not authorize a guardian to discontinue another's life-sustaining
treatment,147 and thus "[tihe petitioner seeking such authority must proceed according
to the common law of New York regarding the right to make decisions regarding life-
sustaining treatment."'
' 48
New York deviated from its strict vitalist stance only in response to public outcry.
The first time it created a statutory exception to the general rule was with its do-not-
resuscitate ("DNR") law. These laws were enacted after the "purple dot affair" of
1984,149 in which a grand jury determined that health-care providers were entering do
not resuscitate orders on patients' charts without the patient's or family's consent. The
providers indicated the order by placing a purple dot on patients' charts. The affair
brought to light the need to place DNR decisions in the hands of patients and their
families.
The second statutory exception to New York's vitalist position is the Health Care
Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retardation, 150 which was passed after the
negative publicity following the Pouliot case.' 51 The act allows court-appointed
surrogates for the mentally retarded to terminate life-sustaining treatment after
following a fairly rigorous protocol. The act makes "refusal of life-sustaining treatment
the option of last resort, to be employed only when treatment is futile and
inhumane."1
52
The cumulative effect of these laws is that certain incompetent patients in New
York may be relieved of certain types of medical care at the discretion of a third
party. 153 Most may not. The surrogate for the minority of patients who once had
competence and who left clear and convincing evidence of a specific subjective intent
144. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(1) (McKinney 2002).
145. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(2)(b) (McKinney 2002).
146. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1996).
147. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.03(i), 81.29(e) (McKinney 1996).
148. Rose Mary Bailly, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03, at 267-
68 (McKinney 1996); see also Law Revision Comm'n Comments to N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
81.29, at 414 (McKinney 1996).
149. Ronald Sullivan, Hospital's Data Faulted in Care of Terminally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1984, at B1 (reporting a state grand jury finding that DNR orders at one hospital were
indicated on patients' charts with a purple dot to avoid detection).
150. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT. §§ 1750, 1750-b (McKinney 2003).
151. See, e.g., Deborah Williams, Who Has the Right to Choose Death, BuFFALo NEws,
April 23, 2000, at Hi.
152. Golden, supra note 105, at 17.
153. The extent to which New York's general rule applies to mechanical ventilation is
questionable. A recent trial court decision holds that a mother may order that her infant ought to
be removed from mechanical respirator rather than languish in a persistent vegetative state. See
In re AB, No. 401184/03, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 878 (May 16, 2003).
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to decline treatment under the circumstances presented or the agent for those who
appointed a health care proxy and had the required conversation about nutrition and
hydration with the agent may make the choices. Also, a surrogate for a person with
mental retardation may make what is sometimes the medically appropriate choice to
terminate life-sustaining treatment.'-4
Other surrogates and family members of incompetent patients may not decide to
terminate treatment that is sustaining an incompetent patient's life even if the patient is
suffering as a result of the treatment.
B. Missouri
When it comes to the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration, Missouri is the
strictest vitalist state in the nation. Missouri surrogates (aside from designated health
care agents) can prevent the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration only if the
patient previously left clear and convincing evidence that he or she would have wanted
that course followed under the circumstance now at hand. 55 Thus, for the permanently
incompetent, and for those who failed to indicate wishes ahead of time, the only legal
option is continued nutrition and hydration. There are no statutory exceptions.
Interestingly, Missouri's intermediate appellate courts appear to have limited the
scope of the limitations on surrogate decisionmaking to artificial nutrition and
hydration. One court held that the Cruzan rules do not apply to DNR decisions.
156
Another summarized Missouri law:
Courts permit guardians to make decisions for a ward which serve the
ward's best interests. When appropriate constraints are met, courts may
even authorize a guardian to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from the
ward. The current law in Missouri with regard to a guardian's power to
terminate the use of a gastrostomy tube for a ward who is in a persistent
vegetative state is set forth in Cruzan. 157
Thus, Missouri wards might not have to suffer the medical consequences of all life-
sustaining treatment. 158 However, the majority of those wards, all those who have
never had competence and those who did not express their wishes with clarity while
competent, remain vulnerable to the same fate suffered by Sheila Pouliot.
C. Michigan
Michigan dramatically limited the ability of surrogates to terminate life-sustaining
treatment for the incompetent in 1995 in In re Martin. 59 In Martin, Michigan's top
court held that a surrogate could not terminate life-sustaining treatment unless the
154. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750 (McKinney 2003).
155. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
156. In re Warren v. Wheeler, 858 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a
surrogate of an incompetent patient may decline resuscitation on behalf of that patient if the
decision is made in the patient's best interests).
157. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *12 (Mar. 5, 1991).
158. Because Warren and Busalacchi were not reviewed by the state's highest court, their
value as precedent is limited.
159. 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
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surrogate could prove by clear and convincing evidence that a patient had expressed a
specific subjective intent to decline treatment under the circumstances presented.
Specifically, the court denied the request of Mary Martin to terminate life-sustaining
nutrition and hydration for her husband, who although incompetent, still had the
capacity to relate to his environment.16°
Michael Martin sustained severe and permanent neurological injuries in a car
accident that also injured his wife and three children. For eleven years, he existed in
pain, completely paralyzed on his left side and with minimal movement on his right.
He was unable to walk, eat, talk, or control his bladder or bowels. He was unable to
communicate in any meaningful way, and was dependent on medically provided
nutrition and hydration.' 6 1 Prior to the accident, Michael "had an almost pathological
fear of illness, weakness, helplessness, and dependency. Michael's wife, Mary, felt
very strongly that his prior lifestyle, conduct, and explicit statements indicated that
Michael would not want to continue living in a dependent state.'
' 62
The trial court and intermediate appellate court both agreed that there was clear
and convincing evidence that Michael Martin had expressed an intent to decline life-
sustaining treatment under the circumstances presented, and granted the wife's request.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision. 163 It rejected all arguments that a
surrogate should be able to decide-under any standard-that terminating treatment is
what would be best for a patient in a state like Michael Martin's. 164 It recognized that
the right to refuse treatment could be discharged by a surrogate, but essentially limited
that right to those who acted while competent. "In other words, the patient possesses
the right to have his own decisions enforced, and not to have the right to refuse
treatment exercised by another on his behalf."'
' 65
Consequently, in Michigan, a surrogate for a patient who has never had
competence, or for a patient whose views are not known, lacks any ability to terminate
life-sustaining treatment. "Only when the patient's prior statements clearly illustrate a
serious, well thought out, consistent decision to refuse treatment under these exact
circumstances, or circumstances highly similar to the current situation, should
treatment be refused or withdrawn."'
Thus, certain Michigan patients, those who had competence but did not express
their wishes in a formal way while competent, could be subjected to the inhumane
treatment inflicted upon Sheila Pouliot. There is some hope for those patients and for
those who never had competence. The court expressly limited its holding to the facts
presented. It expressed
160. Id.
161. See Lawrence J. Nelson & Ronald E. Cranford, Michael Martin and Robert
Wendland: Beyond the Vegetative State, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 427,432 (1999)
(summarizing facts from a variety of sources).
162. Id. at 433.
163. Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 407.
164. It rejected the substituted judgment standard as "a legal fiction that in reality
substitutes the surrogate's decision to withdraw treatment for that of the patient." Id. "The
problem with the best-interests test," said the court, "is that it lets another make a determination
of a patient's quality of life, thereby undermining the foundation of self-determination and
inviolability of the person upon which the right to refuse medical treatment stands." Id. at 408
(quoting In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989)).
165. Nelson & Cranford, supra note 161, at 439 (citing Martin).
166. Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 411.
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no opinion about the proper decision-making standard for patients who
have never been competent, patients existing in a persistent vegetative
state, patients who are experiencing great pain, or patients who are
terminally ill. If a patient has any of these conditions, or ailments of a
similar nature, a more objective approach may be necessary and
appropriate. 1
67
Outside of Martin, however, Michigan provides no guidance to physicians,
families, or lower courts on how to decide any cases involving patients who never had
competence or who have excessive pain. Based upon its dismissal of substituted
judgment and best interest standards, and the inevitable reluctance of courts to allow
termination of treatment that will result in death without affirmative guidance from a
high court or a legislature, it seems likely that all incompetent Michigan patients who
have not formally expressed their wishes will be kept alive by Michigan courts until a
case limiting the Martin standard is decided by the Michigan Supreme Court.
D. Wisconsin
Wisconsin allows surrogates to terminate life-sustaining treatment for patients in
vegetative states, 16 but it does not allow surrogates of patients who have any
awareness of their surroundings to make the same choice.
The seminal case involved Edna M.F., a seventy-one-year-old woman in the late
stages of Alzheimer's. 169 She was bedridden, but responded to stimulation from voice,
movement, and mildly noxious stimuli. 170 She breathed on her own, but her life was
sustained through artificial nutrition and hydration poured into a surgically inserted
feeding tube. ' 71 Edna's sister and court-appointed guardian sought permission to direct
the termination of nutrition and hydration.' 72 They testified that Edna would not have
wanted to live without the use of her mind. 173 The court rejected their request and held
that a "guardian may only direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment,
including nutrition and hydration, if the incompetent ward is in a persistent vegetative
state and the decision to withdraw is in the best interests of the ward."'174 Edna was not
in a persistent vegetative state. 75 Thus, the best interests test did not apply. Instead, the
court said that Edna's sister could only terminate the treatment if she could
"demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence a clear statement of Edna's desires in
these circumstances." 76 Where, as in Edna's case, those wishes were not known or not
167. Id. at 409. Interestingly, the Storar court also explained that the result might be
different if the patient was in excessive pain. Because of how that case was interpreted in later
decisions, however, that caveat was of no assistance to Sheila Pouliot.
168. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60,68 (1992) (holding that a guardian could
direct the withdrawal of medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, if the ward is in a
persistent vegetative state and the decision to withdraw is in the best interests of the ward).
169. Spahn v. Eisenberg (In re Edna M.F.), 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997).
170. Id. at 487.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 486.
175. Id. at 491.
176. id. at 490.
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knowable, the treatment must go on.
17 7
Thus, while Wisconsin law protects the permanently unconscious from the effects
of life-sustaining treatment, it requires those who are aware of their surroundings (and
thus able to experience the suffering that life-prolonging treatment might cause) to
receive that treatment.
E. Arizona
Arizona's legislature has carved an extreme vitalist rule regarding nutrition and
hydration for incompetent patients into its state law that generally defers to the
judgment of others as to what is in the best interests of a patient. The best interest
standard for medical decisionmaking by third parties applies in most instances, and an
early court decision allowed a public fiduciary to terminate life-sustaining treatment
when it was in a patient's best interest.
178
The legislature stepped in to change the rules with respect to nutrition and
hydration. Statutory law absolutely prohibits surrogates of certain incompetent patients
from making the decision to terminate life-sustaining nutrition and hydration.
Specifically, the surrogacy statute expressly states: "A surrogate who is not the
patient's agent or guardian shall not make decisions to withdraw the artificial
administration of food or fluid." 1
79
Thus, the Arizona Legislature has placed those citizens who lack competence to
make their own decisions and failed to appoint an agent at risk of the same horrific
death suffered by Sheila Pouliot.
F. Other Limitations by Statute: Hawaii, Mississippi, Ohio, and Utah
Several states place specifically targeted limitations on the surrogates of
incompetent patients that limit the ability of surrogates to stop the provision of
nutrition and hydration. For example, Hawaii will allow a surrogate to withhold or
withdraw nutrition and hydration only if two physicians certify that providing it "is
merely prolonging the act of dying and the patient is highly unlikely to have any
neurological response in the future."' 80 Thus, a patient who is aware of her
surroundings and cognizant of pain will be subject to compulsory treatment.
Mississippi law prohibits certain surrogates of patients in long-term care facilities
"from withholding or discontinuing life support, nutrition, hydration, or other
treatment, care or support.''8 When a patient lacks capacity and the surrogate is the
owner, operator, or employee of a residential long-term care institution, treatment is
mandatory.
The Ohio surrogacy statute restricts surrogates from terminating nutrition and
hydration unless the patient has been permanently unconscious for twelve months.
8 2
177. Id. The court left open the question of whether the result would be different if the life-
sustaining treatment was causing pain.
178. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 687 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that Arizona
statutory law allowed a public guardian to exercise an incompetent patient's right to refuse life-
sustaining nutrition and hydration if doing so is in the patient's best interest).
179. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(West 2003).
180. HAw. REV. STAT. § 327E-S(g) (Supp. 2001).
181. Miss. CODEANN. §§ 41-41-211, -215(9) (Supp. 2002).
182. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.08(A)(1)(a), 2133.09(C)(2)(a), (c) (Anderson 2002).
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Thus, the minimally conscious who are aware of their pain must receive treatment.
Moreover, Ohio requires the surrogate of a patient whose wishes were not known to
make a decision under a substituted judgment approach. 183 The statute requires the
majority of family members of a particular level of closeness to the patient to agree to
withdraw treatment. "[I]f a class is equally divided, then the entire surrogate class and
all those below them are disqualified and consent to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
cannot be granted under the statute."'
' 8
Utah allows the surrogate of a person who is over eighteen years old to terminate
life-sustaining treatment, but does not allow the surrogate of a person under eighteen
years old to make the same decision.'8 5 Thus, a child in Utah must be provided life-
sustaining treatment, regardless of its effect on the child.
IV. PURE VITALISM IS WORSE THAN DEATH
"[A] medical recommendation to effectively deny sustenance to a starving patient would be
unreasonable on its face."'
186
"Dying is easier and less distressing when we do not give fluids by artificial means."'
8 7
The foregoing review of state laws reveals that although most states allow families
or other surrogates to terminate life-sustaining treatment for an incompetent patient, the
laws in a significant number of states are riddled with quirks that require the
maintenance of human life (mostly through the provision of nutrition and hydration)
regardless of the cost to the patient or the patient's family. 188 The laws are obviously
meant to protect vulnerable patients. To a large extent, they succeed; by making it
impossible for surrogates to withhold treatment on account of a patient's disability,
financial status, or other factor unrelated to the patient's well being, they ensure that
these factors play no part in the decisionmaking process.'89 Sometimes, however, their
effect is perversely contrary. Rather than protecting the most vulnerable people, these
laws require their suffering.
The premise of vitalist laws is that there is no harm to the patient created by
continuation of the status quo. 190 The Sheila Pouliot case dramatically refutes the
accuracy of that premise. The nutrition-and-hydration-at-aU-costs approach ignores the
medical reality that providing treatment that might technically sustain life can cause the
patient extraordinary harm and pain. It also ignores that there are situations when
183. § 2133.08(D)(3).
184. Mark Stephen Bishop, Crossing the Decisional Abyss: An Evaluation of Surrogate
Decisionmaking Statutes as a Means of Bridging the Gap Between Post Quinlan Red Tape and
the Realization of an Incompetent Patient's Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment,
7 ELDER L.J. 153, 177 (1999).
185. See generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105, -1107 (2002).
186. In re Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d 373, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
187. McGrail aff., supra note 65, at 1645.
188. See supra Part IHI.
189. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1989) ("And even where
family members are present '(t]here will, of course, be some unfortunate situations in which
family members will not act to protect a patient.' A State is entitled to guard against potential
abuses in such situations.") (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (1987)).
190. Cf. Gostin, supra note 123, at 36-38 (explaining that vitalist philosophy values life
over all other concerns).
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providing life-sustaining treatment is outside the bounds of medically accepted care.' 91
When the premise that maintaining life causes no harm reflects reality, the
application of vitalist laws insisting on the maintenance of life is legal.192 Cruzan gave
states permission to adopt procedures that require the maintenance of life in the
absence of a personal exercise of autonomy. But Cruzan did not involve a factual
situation like Sheila Pouliot's in which the provision of artificial nutrition and
hydration was medically contraindicated because it caused extraordinary harm and
excruciating pain to the patient. In such cases, the application of laws requiring
treatment is highly suspect.
This Part argues that state laws that require the provision of life-sustaining
treatment (in particular nutrition and hydration) violate the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of patients when they require patients to receive medically inappropriate
treatment that causes pain. In other words, the Constitution requires that all states that
have adopted vitalist policies for some of their citizens limit them when the treatment
that would prolong life also causes physical suffering with no hope of cure.
This Part goes on to explore whether the limited application of vitalist laws to
incompetent patients discriminates against the patients in violation of constitutional or
statutory law. Specifically, it examines whether the laws violate the equal protection
rights of patients, ultimately concluding that they do not. The statutory analysis is
different. When states force disabled people to receive harmful and inappropriate
treatment in the name of life because they are unable to exercise the autonomy
necessary to escape treatment, the states deny disabled patients a public
accommodation because of their disability (i.e., current inability to make medical
decisions) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
A. Why Providing Life-Sustaining Treatment is Sometimes Medically Inappropriate
Physicians are able to sustain a person's life functions for extended periods of time
using various technologies, but doing so indefinitely is not appropriate. It is well
established that prolonging a person's life indefinitely can cause unreasonable burdens
to the patient. 193 For that reason, the consensus among palliative care specialists is that
terminating life-sustaining treatment is an appropriate course of treatment in the final
191. To be sure, there are many instances when health care providers and families skirt the
vitalist laws, either by overlooking them entirely or by striving to apply the rules "to avoid
clinically intolerable results." Golden, supra note 105, at 19 (citing Robert N. Swidler, Harsh
State Rule on End-of-Life Care in Need of Reform, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26,2000, at S-4). "They may
accept as clear and convincing evidence the family's recollection of a patient's isolated,
informal remarks. Or they may rule out certain treatments as 'futile' because they would not
restore the patient's health." Id. at 25 n.58 (quoting Swidler, supra).
192. That is not to say that vitalist laws reflect the best moral choice or the most sound
policy. Vitalist limitations deny patients dignity and cause families agony by taking their
concerns out of the equation. See Boozang, supra note 8, and McKnight & Bellis, supra note
13, for critiques of the state policies that defer to life, rather than the best interest of the patient
or of the family. Nonetheless, these policies are legally permissible, up to a point.
193. See Thomas E. Finucan et al., Tube Feeding in Patients with Advanced Dementia, A
Review of the Evidence, 282 JAMA 1365 (1999) (concluding that tube feeding should be
discouraged in severely demented patients because the risks outweigh the benefits); Christopher
M. Callahan, MD et al., Outcomes of Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy Among Older
Adults in a Community Setting, 48 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC. 1048 (2000) (concluding that
gastrostomy tubes can burden patients without providing concomitant benefits).
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stages of dying. 194 Terminating nutrition and hydration respects the natural dying
process and provides pain relief. As death approaches "[m]ost patients completely lose
their appetite and stop drinking."' 195 The natural urge has direct benefits. "[Miost
experts feel that dehydration in the last hour of living does not cause distress and may
stimulate the release of endorphins and anaesthetic compounds that promote the
patient's sense of well being."'196 Stopping nutrition and hydration can also prevent
harm. "Intravenous lines can be cumbersome and particularly uncomfortable when the
patient is cachectic, or has no discernible veins. Excess parenteral fluids can lead to
fluid overload with consequent peripheral or pulmonary edema, worsened
breathlessness, cough, and orotracheobronchial secretions, particularly if there is
significant hypoalbuminemia." 19 7 Thus, the termination of nutrition and hydration itself
provides pain relief and can prevent serious harm to the patient.
Continuing to provide calories and hydration throughout the final stages of dying
can be catastrophic to the patient. Sheila Pouliot suffered the dire consequences of the
prolonged provisions of calories and hydration in the absence of nutritive protein. Her
skin broke down, she swelled to grotesque proportions, her body began to catabolize
its own organs, her muscles rotted, and her heart deteriorated. Moreover, she was in
excruciating pain because of the treatment. In contrast, she rested comfortably during
the several days that physicians abided her family's request to withhold nutrition and
hydration.
Most states have accepted as policy the medical view that prolonging a person's
life functions may be inappropriate by enacting laws that recognize that life-sustaining
treatment can become unduly burdensome to patients. 98 Indeed, four states that
otherwise require life-sustaining treatment for those whose wishes are not known or
knowable make an exception when the treatment itself causes an undue burden or
excessive pain. 1
99
194. See Robert M. McCann et al., Comfort Care for Terminally Ill Patients: The
Appropriate Use of Nutrition and Hydration, 272 JAMA 1263 (1994) (recognizing that
providing nutrition and hydration to terminally ill patients can cause unwanted and painful side
effects and finding that terminating the treatment increases patient comfort); Robert J. Sullivan,
Jr., MD, Accepting Death Without Artificial Nutrition or Hydration, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
220 (1993); BRITSH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE-
PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT: GUIDANCE FOR DECISION MAKING (BMJ Books 1999).
195. Frank D. Ferris et al., Ensuring Competency in End-of-Life Care: Controlling
Symptoms, BMC PALLIATIVE CARE, July 30, 2002, at 10, available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-684X-1-5.pdf (citing Eduardo Bruera & R.L.
Fainsinger, Clinical Management of Cachexia and Anorexia, in OxFORD TEXTBOOK OF
PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 548, 548 (Derek Doyle et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998); and J.A.
Billings, Comfort Measures for the Terminally Ill: Is Dehydration Painful?, 33 J. Am.
GERIATRICS SOC., 808 (1985)) (last visited Jan. 13, 2004).
196. Ferris et al., supra note 195, at 10 (citing J.E. Ellershaw et al., Dehydration and the
Dying Patient, 10 J. PAIN SYM. & MANAGEMENT 192 (1995)); C.F. Musgrave et. al., The
Sensation of Thirst in Dying Patients Receiving IV Hydration, 11 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 17
(1995); D.R. Musgrave, Terminal Dehydration: To Give or Not to Give Intravenous Fluids?, 13
CANCER NURSING 62 (1990).
197. Ferris et al., supra note 195, at 10
198. See infra Appendix for complete list of statutes that allow surrogates to terminate
treatment.
199. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629(3) (Michie 2001); N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. ACTLAW §
1750-(b)(4) (McKinney Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-06.1 (2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.635 (2001).
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Even the National Conference of Catholic Bishops recognizes that prolonging life
functions may impose an "unreasonable burden" in the final stages of dying:
In the final stage of dying one is not obliged to prolong the life of a patient
by every possible means: "When inevitable death is imminent in spite of
the means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse
forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome
prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in
similar cases is not interrupted."
200
Despite the medical, legal, and pastoral agreement that providing treatment to
prolong life functions may become unacceptable, state laws in New York, Missouri,
Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin, Ohio, Hawaii, and Utah require indefinite treatment in
certain cases involving patients who lack capacity to speak for themselves.20 The
threshold legal issue is whether the Federal Constitution protects those patients for
whom no surrogate may speak from the harmful effects of the treatment. The answer is
yes only if the patients have a liberty interest that is not outweighed by state interests.
B. Does the Forced Provision of Life-Sustaining Treatment that Is Also Medically
Contraindicated and Causes Avoidable Suffering Violate the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Cruzan held that a state's interest in preserving life is so important that a state can
protect it by refusing to let any third party decide that the quality of life of another
person has deteriorated to the point that life-sustaining treatment should be terminated.
Recent cases suggest that Cruzan must be limited when the life-sustaining treatment
causes a dying person pain or is medically contraindicated. In other words, the Due
Process Clause gives all patients, including the incompetent, the right to be free from
unnecessary iatrogenic pain or contraindicated medical care. The states cannot erect
absolute barriers that prevent anyone from enforcing these rights on behalf of those
patients who are unable to speak for themselves.
1. The Right to Pain Control
After the Supreme Court issued its decisions in the physician assisted suicide
cases, 202 legal commentators noted that although the Court refused to recognize a right
to suicide, it appeared to recognize a right to palliative care. First, Yale's Robert Burt
argued that "[a] court majority effectively required all states to ensure that their laws
do not obstruct the provision of adequate palliative care, especially for the alleviation
200. Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops Comm. for Pro-Life Activities, Nutrition and
Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455, 457-58
(1999) (reprinted from 6 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PASTORAL LETTERS AND
STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 428-29 (Patrick W. Carey ed., 1988)
(quoting CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA, PT. IV
(U.S. Catholic Conferece ed., 1980)).
201. See supra Part Il.
202. See, e.g.,Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997).
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of pain and other physical symptoms of people facing death.' '20 3 Alan Meisel then
noted a trend towards the development of an even broader right: "Over the past few
years, a concrete right of terminally ill patients to adequate pain control has gradually
begun to emerge, first from state legislation and later from decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.
' 204
The argument for the emerging right to pain control is based on the unanimous
recognition of a distinction between "prohibiting conduct on the part of physicians that
intentionally hastens death and permitting conduct that may foreseeably hasten death
but is intended for other important purposes, such as the relief of pain,, 20 5 and on
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Glucksberg. The Court's recognition that a
physician can validly provide treatment that benefits the patient by relieving pain even
though that treatment might hasten death suggests that the same physician can validly
deny treatment that would cause pain, even if denying that treatment would cause
death.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence goes further. It strongly suggests that the
avoidance of pain at death is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The opinion "refers twice to the allegedly undisputed availability of
medication (to alleviate suffering) and palliative care," 2°6 and concludes that the Court
need not decide "the question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally
cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the suffering they may experience in the
last days of their lives" because "[t]here is no dispute that dying patients in
Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would
hasten their deaths." 20 7 Thus, her concurrence implied that "if a future case were
presented to the Court in which there was a 'dispute' about the existence of state
barriers to adequate palliative care, then this would be the 'quite different' and
203. Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: NotAssisted Suicide but a Constitutional
Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234 (1997).
Taking into account the tenor of Justice Souter's opinion, a majority of the
Court (Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer) clearly
accepted that dying individuals have a right to be free of unnecessary pain
and suffering at the end of life. Robert Burt concludes from this that "a
Court majority has found that states must not impose barriers on the
availability of palliative care for terminally ill patients" and that state laws
"restricting the availability of opioids for the management of pain are the
most likely targets for judicial invalidation by this criterion."
Pratt, supra note 72, at 223; see also Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the
Physician Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MINN. L. REv. 895, 908 (1998) (stating that five justices
appear to accept a liberty interest in pain relief).
204. Alan Meisel, Pharmacists, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Pain Control, 2 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 211,214-15 (1999) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,736-38
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Larry I. Palmer, Institutional Analysis and
Physicians' Rights After Vacco v. Quill, 7 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 424-26 (1998)
(arguing that Justice O'Connor has opened the door to future litigation regarding barriers to
pain relief); Kathryn L. Tucker, The Death with Dignity Movement: Protecting Rights and
Expanding Options After Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MwN. L. REv. 923,935-36 (1998) (arguing
that at least five members of the Supreme Court would likely strike down state legislation
requiring life-sustaining treatment if it would force dying people to endure excessive pain).
205. Burt, supra note 203, at 1234.
206. Pratt, supra note 72, at 222.
207. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737-38 (1997).
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'considerably stronger' argument that could lead her to a different result."2 8 Four other
Justices agreed with her assertions.
Any requirement that a patient receive treatment indefinitely creates an
impermissible barrier to palliative care. Terminating treatment is as essential to
appropriate palliative care practice as is the administration of opiods. Thus, to the
extent that Quill and Glucksberg recognize a right to palliative care, those cases
suggest that the states may not erect absolute barriers to termination of treatment. It is
noteworthy, moreover, that the courts need not recognize an affirmative right to
palliative care to protect someone like Sheila Pouliot; the courts need only recognize a
prohibition against state action that affirmatively causes the dying process to be
prolonged and painful.
The right to be free from a state-mandated prolonged and painful death is not only
supported by the O'Connor concurrence in Glucksberg, it is required under the
analytical framework set forth by the Rehnquist majority. In Glucksberg, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that the Due Process Clause "protects those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."- 209 Physician-assisted suicide, an act made criminal throughout the country,
lacked roots in this Nation's history. In contrast, the right to be free of an unnaturally
prolonged and painful death has deep historical roots in constitutional, common, and
statutory law.
The roots to the right to be free of an unnaturally prolonged and painful death
reside in established constitutional rights to freedom from pain, freedom from forced
medication, freedom from confinement, and bodily integrity, which are well
established and consistent with this Nation's history and traditions.21 Indeed, it is
unassailable that when a state actor inflicts "appreciable physical pain.... Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are implicated. 21 '
The constitutional liberty interests belong equally to the competent and the
incompetent: "[A] child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not
being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment .... "212 An incompetent adult is
like a child, unable to make informed medical decisions. For the most part, the law
treats incompetent adults as children in medical treatment cases.2t 3
The infliction of an unnaturally prolonged and painful death implicates the rights
to freedom from state-inflicted pain, confinement, and bodily invasion. Life-sustaining
treatment can cause pain and prevent the natural release of endorphins. Forcing
208. Burt, supra note 203, at 1235.
209. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1997)).
210. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (state may not give unwanted medication
to a defendant unless essential to ensure safety of defendant or others); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210 (1990) (significant liberty interest in refusing unwanted medication, here forcible
injection of medication); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (forcing criminal defendant to
undergo surgery to remove an evidentiary bullet violates defendant's right to be secure in his
person); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcing defendant to vomit to produce
evidence "shocks the conscience"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (forced
sterilization violates basic civil right to procreate); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674
(1977) (finding corporal punishment implicates liberty interests despite its long tradition
because individuals have a right to be free from appreciable pain inflicted by a state).
211. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674.
212. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
213. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
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treatment can hurt patients in two ways: by causing the painful buildup of excess fluid
and by denying the body its own capacity for pain relief. Sustained treatment also
confines the patient both literally in a hospital bed (often restrained or sedated to
prevent the patient from pulling out the tubes through which the treatment is provided)
and metaphysically in the dying process. Further, treatment that causes the body to
catabolize itself or causes muscles to rot obviously destroys the integrity of the
patient's body. Thus, like corporal punishment or compelled surgery, the forced
treatment with nutrition and hydration implicates long standing liberty interests.
Like the Constitution, the common law also has historically protected against the
infliction of pain and unwanted medication by the state. At common law, forced
medication was a battery. 214 The Cruzan court reaffirmed that "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." 21 5 In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court recognized "the long legal tradition protecting
the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment."
2 16
The right to freedom from state-inflicted suffering at death also has roots in
statutory law. Twenty-one states have statutes providing a right to palliative care, to
allow physicians to treat patients with aggressive pain relief without fear of
prosecution.217
Thus, unlike physician assisted suicide, which lacked historical roots, the law has
long provided protection against state-inflicted pain through forced medication. The
Due Process Clause protects against these intrusions.
2. A Prohibition Against Compelled Medically Inappropriate Treatment
In addition to recognizing the right to be free from state-compelled suffering,
several decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that states cannot compel inappropriate
medical treatment without running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has applied a "medical appropriateness" limitation that requires courts
to find that state-compelled medical treatment is in the patient's best medical interests
before considering whether the state can justify the imposition of the medication.218
The Court has most clearly established the medical appropriateness limitation in
cases involving forced treatments of inmates. Those cases make clear that involuntary
treatment raises questions of clear constitutional importance 219 by recognizing a
214. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
215. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (quoting Union Pac.
R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
216. 521 U.S. 702, 703.
217. Meisel, supra note 204, at 216 n.26 (1999) (listing statutes).
218. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 n.8 (1990) (stating that forced
medication may be administered only after "the inmate's treating physician... make[s] the
decision that medication is appropriate").
219. See Sell v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 2186 (2003) (requiring State to prove that,
in light of all possible alternatives, the need for antipsychotic treatment is medically appropriate
and "sufficiently important to overcome the individual's protected interest in refusing it");
Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (recognizing that an individual has a "significant" constitutionally
protected "liberty interest" in "avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs");
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,759 (1985) (expectation of privacy and security are implicated by
the compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body).
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"'significant' constitutionally protected 'liberty interest' in avoiding forced medical
treatment.220 The state may override that interest for the purpose of creating
competency to stand trial only when the forced "treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial,
and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests."
22
'
Thus, states may only administer anti-psychotic drugs to prisoners after proving
the drugs are medically appropriate. The requirement that the treatment be "medically
appropriate, that is, in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical
condition" 222 is a threshold constitutional protection afforded by the Due Process
Clause. The medical appropriateness requirement is, therefore, a fundamental
constitutional limitation that may not be overcome by state interests.
The constitutional requirement that forced medical treatment be medically
appropriate has not yet been applied in any cases dealing with a refusal of treatment at
the end-of-life. It should be. The discussion of the contours of the liberty interest at
stake when the state forces medication on anyone is clearly pertinent to end-of-life
cases. 223 Moreover, like the right to refuse treatment itself, with its "long legal
tradition,, 224 the ability to avoid inappropriate medical care has enjoyed historical legal
protection. The malpractice laws, the informed consent cases, the regulations
prohibiting the dispensation of experimental drugs, and prohibitions on experimental
surgery are all part of the tradition that protects people from inappropriate medical
care. Furthermore, the notion that the state couldforce any person to submit to medical
care that the medical profession deems inappropriate runs against all notions of
fairness and ethical behavior.
In the case of Sheila Pouliot, New York law required doctors to provide hydration
and calories to maintain her life for months after it was no longer medically
appropriate to do so. Because it was medically inappropriate, the state should not have
been permitted to impose treatment. As in prisoner cases, the Due Process Clause
should provide dying patients absolute protection against compelled treatment that is
medically inappropriate. In Sell, the court held that medical appropriateness was a
threshold requirement that must be established before the court could even consider
whether the state's interests justified overriding the patient's liberty interests. The same
protection should apply equally in end-of-life cases. Inmates have no greater liberty
interest in bodily integrity than incompetent patients. States should no more be allowed
to force inappropriate medical care on a dying patient than on a prisoner.
3. Countervailing State Interests
Vitalist states cannot justify laws that require the provision of life-sustaining
treatment when the treatment causes pain and is medically inappropriate. No liberty
220. Sell, 123 S.Ct. at 2183 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 221).
221. Id. at 2184 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 2185 (emphasis in original).
223. Indeed, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990), relied on the
seminal case of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220-22 (1990), to find a liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medication. In Harper, the court noted that "[t]he forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that
person's liberty." 494 U.S. at 229.
224. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).
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interest is absolute. Each must be weighed against countervailing state interests. Where
the liberty interest is fundamental, "the Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the
government to infringe ... at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 225 When the
liberty interest is not fundamental, the state's means need only be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.
226
The right to avoid forced medical treatment is at a minimum a "significant liberty
interest." The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of this right in June 2003,
when the Court applied heightened scrutiny to state actions that deprive prisoners of
their liberty interest in being free of compulsory medication. The Court held that the
prisoner's interest in avoiding unwanted medication is so important that the state may
override it only when it can prove that involuntary medication will significantly further
an "essential" or "overriding" state interest in giving the treatment. The "court must
find that important governmental interests are at stake. 227 Then "the court must
conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state
interests. 228
This test represents a more heightened protection against involuntary medication
than was applied in Glucksberg229 or Cruzan.230 The heightened scrutiny should apply
equally in cases involving state-inflicted pain and inappropriate medical care because
the extraordinary burdens placed on patients in those cases are directly comparable to
the burdens placed on prisoners the state seeks to medicate. Both must be restrained to
receive treatment; both suffer invasions into their bodies by medical equipment and
medication; and both may suffer pain from the treatment.
The presence of pain and the uniform agreement that sustaining life functions was
medically contraindicated distinguish cases like Sheila Pouliot's from Nancy Cruzan's
or the physician-assisted suicide cases. The avoidance of pain and inappropriate
medical treatment have far deeper and more established roots than the right to direct
one's own care or to seek assistance in dying. Thus, the interests at stake are more
fundamental, and the concomitant state interests must be that much more compelling to
justify the imposition.
Traditionally, the Court weighs four state interests against the liberty interest of
patients: preserving life, preserving the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,
the prevention of suicide, and protecting vulnerable populations. None of these state
interests outweighs the patient's liberty interests in avoiding medical treatment that
causes significant pain or is medically inappropriate.
a. The State's Unqualified Interest in Preserving Life
Cruzan allows states to claim an unqualified interest in preserving human life. The
state interest in preserving life is clearly served by vitalist laws. Thus, the state can
"properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular
225. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
226. Id. at 728 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993), and Reno, 507 U.S. at
305).
227. Sell,123 S.Ct. at 2184 (emphasis in original).
228. Id. (emphasis in original).
229. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
230. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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individual may enjoy.' '231 But the states have not asserted the unqualified interest in
preserving life allowed by Cruzan. All the states, even the most vitalist, have qualified
their interest in preserving life by adopting exceptions to the rules that allow a third
party to terminate life-sustaining treatment under certain circumstances even absent an
exercise of a patient's autonomy.
In New York, for example, the state has conceded through its legislation that
allows surrogates of people with mental retardation to terminate life-sustaining
treatment when the treatment causes an extraordinary burden to the patient. That is, the
state's interest in preserving life gives way to a patient's interest in avoiding
extraordinary pain. Furthermore, in Quill, the state assured the Supreme Court that its
interest in life was not so strong as to require a patient to die in pain.232 Thus, New
York can no longer assert with credibility an unqualified interest in preserving life that
outweighs an individual's interest in avoiding pain. To survive constitutional scrutiny
then, New York's laws requiring that incompetents who do not suffer from mental
retardation must be kept alive at all costs must be justified by something other than an
unqualified interest in life.
Like New York, Missouri's interest in preserving life is not unqualified. In
Missouri, the treatment-in-all-instances rules apply only when the treatment is nutrition
and hydration. They do not apply to mechanical ventilation or other forms of life-
sustaining treatment.133 A surrogate can terminate that treatment without evidence of
the intent of the patient when it is in the patient's best interests. Thus, Missouri's
interest in preserving life may be overridden in the best interest of the patient.
Missouri's application of its laws to force life through nutrition and hydration when
that treatment causes pain and suffering must therefore be justified by some other state
interest.
Likewise, Mississippi's interest in preserving life in patients needing life-
sustaining treatment is qualified in most situations by the best interests of the patient.
The general rule allowing surrogates to terminate life-sustaining treatment does not
apply to patients in long-term-care facilities with institutional guardians. 2' That
exception cannot be justified based upon an unqualified interest in preserving life
because that interest does not apply in most cases.
The same analysis applies to each of the vitalist states. 235 Each has qualified its
interest in preserving life in order to protect the best interests of the patient in some
situations. No state can legitimately claim an unqualified interest in preserving the life
of a dying patient to justify the gaps in its laws that place life over patient well being.
231. Id. at 282.
232. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 4, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793, No. 95-1858 (1997) (No. 95-1858) in which then-Attorney General Dennis Vacco
indicated that palliative care that hastens death is lawful in New York because the "right to
ameliorate pain is recognized."
233. See In re Warren v. Wheeler, 858 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
234. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211(9) (1999).
235. Hawaii and Ohio allow surrogates to terminate life-sustaining treatment of the
permanently unconscious. HAw. REv. STAT. § 327E-5 (1999); OtnoREv. CODEANN. § 2133.08
(Anderson 2002). Utah allows it for those over eighteen. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105 (2002).
Michigan has no express exceptions, but the Martin decision indicated one might be made in the
future. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 409 (Hawaii 1995). Wisconsin allows surrogates to
consider quality of life for those in vegetative states, but not for those with awareness of their
surroundings. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60,63 (1992); Spahn v. Eisenberg (in re
Edna M.F.), 563 N.W. 2d 485 (Wisc. 1997).
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The states themselves have conceded that their interest in life folds when people are in
pain. To survive constitutional scrutiny, then, vitalist policies for certain patients must
be justified by some other state interest.
In any event, courts should weigh a state's interest in preserving life differently
when preserving life requires the suffering of a person. In Cruzan, patient suffering
was not at issue. The liberty interest in patient or family choice gave way to the state's
paramount interest in preserving life. When preserving life causes suffering, however,
the equation changes. The patient's right to bodily integrity, comfort, and freedom
from restraint come into play, and the state's interest in preserving life is neither
important in such a case, nor significantly advanced.
b. The State's Interest in Preserving the Integrity of the Medical Profession
States have "an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession., 236 In the case of physician-assisted suicide, the interest is incompatible
because "physician-assisted suicide could... undermine the trust that is essential to
the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-honored line between healing and
harming. ' ' 237 When laws require physicians to keep patients alive at all costs, however,
the integrity of the medical profession is denigrated. Forcing medical professionals to
provide treatment to prolong an agonizing death changes doctors from healers to
agents of harm. Sheila Pouliot's physicians tellingly revealed the impact of New
York's vitalist laws on the medical profession when they wrote in her chart that the
treatment was "inhumane" and "causing grotesque harm." Protecting the medical
profession cannot justify such a result.
c. The State's Interests in the Prevention of Suicide
The state's interest in preventing suicide is not implicated by cases like Sheila
Pouliot's. Because she and patients like her cannot form an intent to kill themselves,
the risk of their doing so through a surrogate is absent. Moreover, the Court has
affirmed the conceptual distinction between "prohibiting conduct on the part of
physicians that intentionally hastens death and permitting conduct that may foreseeably
hasten death but is intended for other important purposes, such as the relief of pain. 238
A law properly tailored to balance the intrusion on personal liberty against the risk of
active killing will thus allow physicians to terminate treatment where appropriate to
eliminate suffering, but prohibit conduct intentionally designed to hasten death.
d. The State's Interests in the Protection of Vulnerable Patients
The pockets of vitalism that remain throughout the country are probably best
explained by an intent to protect certain vulnerable populations. To be sure, "the State
has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and
disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes., 239 That interest is undoubtedly
important and justifies the heightened evidentiary standard applicable to treatment
termination decisions adopted by New York, Missouri, and Michigan.
236. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
237. Id.
238. Burt, supra note 203, at 1234.
239. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
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The failure of those states, and states like Arizona, Mississippi, Hawaii, and Utah,
that create bright line rules requiring continued treatment in all cases involving
particular populations, is their refusal to make exceptions when the required treatment
affirmatively harms a member of a vulnerable population. In such a case, no court
could conclude that the "involuntary medication will significantly further those
concomitant state interests" 24° in protecting vulnerable populations. In the case of
Sheila Pouliot, for example, the state's attempt to protect her caused her grotesque
harm.
Moreover, the bright line rule is not tailored in any way to serve the interest of the
patient. In Sell, the Court required the state to show that "involuntary medication is
necessary" to further the state's interests.24' States that attempt to protect the
vulnerable from mistreatment or euthanasia through vitalist laws cannot show that
treatment is necessary to protect a patient when all the patient's medical providers and
her family agree that it is not.
Thus, while states are free to create safeguards to ensure that a decision to
terminate treatment for an incompetent patient is being made to protect the patient, the
states may not advance their interest in protecting vulnerable populations by applying
bright line rules that require treatment despite the harm caused to the patient. When
they force certain dying patients to suffer a prolonged death without the benefit of the
natural processes that make death less agonizing, vitalist rules serve no legitimate
purpose and paint with a broader brush than is permissible under the Constitution. The
vitalist states therefore must create an exception to their absolute barrier to terminating
life-sustaining treatment to prevent pain and the provision of medically contraindicated
care.
C. Discrimination
Just as a person's disability must not be a reason to withhold treatment, it should
not be a reason to force harmful treatment. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws and the Federal statutes prohibiting discrimination against the
disabled are both implicated by cases such as Sheila Pouliot's in which the patient is
given inappropriate medical care because of a disability that leaves him or her unable
to exercise autonomy.242 While violation of the constitutional guarantee may be
difficult to establish, the statutory violation appears clear.
1. Equal Protection
An equal protection challenge is not likely to be a source of support for those who
hope to change the way vitalist states treat incompetent patients. The Equal Protection
Clause directs that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike," but those
who are not competent and whose wishes are not known are not similarly situated to
240. Sell v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 2184 (2003).
241. Id. at 2185 (emphasis in original).
242. Philip G. Peters, Jr. points out that "[t]he possibility of improper discrimination arises
whenever a patient's disability plays a role in the physician's determination that life-sustaining
care would be inappropriate." Philip G. Peters, Jr., When Physicians Balk at Futile Care:
Implications of the Disability Rights Laws, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 798, 805 (1997). The possibility
of disability discrimination also arises when state laws limit treatment options for the disabled.
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those who are competent or those whose wishes are known.2 43 Thus, states may treat
the incompetent whose wishes are not known or knowable differently from others for
whom treatment may be terminated.
Even when states treat similarly situated groups of incompetent people differently
(for example, when laws distinguish between dying patients depending on whether
their surrogate is a family member or an institutional provider 244 or whether their
medical need is life-sustaining surgery or nutrition and hydration 24), the different
treatment is probably permissible. It need only have a rational basis.
[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis "is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." Nor
does it authorize "the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas
that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." For
these reasons, a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of
validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment
and some legitimate governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that
creates these categories need not "actually articulate at any time the
purpose or rationale supporting its classification." Instead, a classification
"must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification."
246
The rational basis standard is so deferential to states that it would likely be satisfied by
a state's claim that the select group was particularly vulnerable to abuse or that the type
of treatment required (nutrition and hydration) was different from all other
treatments.247
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Federal statutes, especially the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), provide
broader protection against disability discrimination than that provided by the
Constitution.248 The vitalist laws may, if applied without exception, violate the ADA in
243. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12 (1989).
244. MISS. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-41-211, -215 (Supp. 2002).
245. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 1997).
246. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
247. The one place that an equal protection challenge might succeed is in Sheila Pouliot's
home state of New York. There, in the wake of Sheila Pouliot's death, the state created
distinctions among the permanently incompetent. Those who have never had capacity because
of mental retardation are protected from pain-creating treatment. Those who have never had
capacity for some other reason are not. The distinction is wholly arbitrary.
248. Two federal statutes protect people with disabilities from improper discrimination.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994), provides that "no
otherwise qualified individual with a disability.. . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... The
ADA's coverage is broader, applying to disability-based discrimination to employers, doctor's
offices, and hospitals. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12131, 12181(7), 12182 (2000). Because the
coverage of the ADA is broader, this article focuses on that statute.
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certain cases.249 The ADA prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the... services ... of any place of public accommodation by
any person who... operates [such] a place."' 0 The ADA also forbids "utilizing
standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination
on the basis of disability" without regard to whether such conduct has a rational
basis.25 ' Medical care clearly falls under the Act's operation.252
Families and disabilities advocates have successfully turned to the ADA to force
health care providers to treat the disabled. Their argument is that a disabled person is
entitled to all medical care that would be provided to a nondisabled person. Thus, an
HIV infected woman successfully sued under the Act after a dentist refused to fill her
cavity in his office instead of the hospital, and the mother of an anencephalic infant
was able to use the Act, and other causes of action, to force a hospital to keep her baby
alive through ventilation.253 The reasoning in these cases is that treatment that would
be available to the nondisabled must be available to the disabled.
Applying the same rationale to the Pouliot case, it appears that New York law
violated the ADA by limiting Ms. Pouliot' s treatment options on the basis of disability.
The law prevented doctors from providing medically appropriate palliative care, which
in her case required the termination of nutrition and hydration, despite their agreement,
and the guardian and family's belief, that aggressive palliative care was the appropriate
course. Palliative care is-like dental treatment or life-sustaining treatment-a public
accommodation available to the general public. The law thus denied Ms. Pouliot a
public accommodation. She was, moreover, denied the accommodation on the basis of
her disability, her inability to form or express an intent. Furthermore, the state's
standards, criteria, and methods for determining who may receive appropriate
palliative care have a clear disparate impact on the disabled because they disqualify
certain groups of disabled people from accessing that care. Because the ADA makes
the existence of a rational basis for the disparate treatment irrelevant, the statutory
violation seems clear. Thus, palliative care should be available to severely disabled
people, just as it is available to others. New York and other states that make it
inaccessible because it hastens death are violating the ADA.
3. Danger of Using Disability Laws
The advocacy of the affirmative use of disability laws to argue that a disabled
person should be allowed to die will raise red flags with anyone familiar with the vocal
community of disability advocates who argue vociferously that all "right-to-die" cases
hurt rather than help the disabled community.25 Those advocates argue that "any
249. Private individuals may not sue states or state officials for damages under the ADA.
Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The ADA's standards may "be enforced by the
United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)." Id. at 374 n.9.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000).
251.42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (2000).
252. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
253. Abbot v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999); In
re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), afT'd on other grounds, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.
1994).
254. Brief of Amici Curiae Not Dead Yet et. al, Schindler v. Schaivo, 851 So. 2d (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 2D02-5394), at http:llwww.notdeadyet.org/docs/schaivobrief.html.
Not Dead Yet, an advocacy group dedicated to pure vitalism for all people, argues that "the
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decision not to treat based on patient quality of life violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act.,
255
Thus, they argue that the ADA can be used only to require treatment, not to
terminate it. Their argument goes too far. It assumes that all decisions to withhold
treatment are intended to end a person's life. This assumption is fallacious.
Terminating treatment is part of good palliative care practice. Like a decision to
provide pain relieving drugs despite the fact that they might hasten death, a decision to
terminate treatment may be made to increase patient comfort or to eliminate pain. If the
disability advocates were right, and the ADA prohibited any decision to terminate
treatment, then the ADA would prohibit the disabled from receiving appropriate
palliative care. Surely a disability-rights statute could not be intended to keep the
disabled from accessing an entire medical specialty. To the contrary, if applied
logically and consistently with its statutory purpose, the ADA should ensure that
people with disabilities have the same access to palliative care as all other patients,
even if that care hastens their deaths.
The difficulty with using the ADA in medical treatment cases arises when the
players-the patient's surrogate, guardian and physicians--disagree as to the
appropriate course of treatment. In such cases, the ADA offers little guidance. The Act
does not prescribe a particular course of treatment or demand that any particular
person make choices for a disabled person. Instead, the Act ensures that whoever is
making decisions has the option of choosing any appropriate course of treatment.
Indeed, the issues of who should make a treatment decision and under what
standard should be decided without reference to the ADA. The ADA is an appropriate
tool, however, to be sure that the decisionmaker has the right to choose any acceptable
alternative that would be available to nondisabled patients. Thus, in a case like Sheila
Pouliot's, when the players all agreed that terminating treatment was appropriate but
the law created a barrier to an appropriate course of treatment, the use of the ADA to
break the barrier would be acceptable.
To be sure, the use of disability laws in medical debate is troubling when families
demand care that might be ethically inappropriate or inhumane. 256 That disability laws
might be misused by families in some cases, however, does not mean that families that
are seeking medically appropriate care should avoid using them.
For better or worse the disability laws are being applied to medical treatment
cases. It is reasonable that they should be available to protect disabled persons from
overtreatment, as well as undertreatment. People with disabilities should have access to
good medical care, including palliative care. The care Sheila Pouliot received was by
proposed starvation and dehydration [of an incompetent individual] would violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act." Id.
255. Peters, supra note 242, at 806 (citing Jane Bryant Quinn, Taking Back Their Health
Care, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1994, at 36); James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, When Worlds
Collide: Disability Rights and Medical Prerogatives in Matters of Life and Death, 7 HEC
FORUM 132 (1995).
256. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993) (allowing treatment
characterized as "'futile' or 'inhumane' by physicians based on broad readings of disability
laws), affd., 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). The use of disability laws to direct medical treatment
is also decried by commentators who argue that medical decisions should be made as a matter of
professional discretion, not court intervention. E.g., Susan Moriarity Miltko, The Need for
Professional Discretion: Health Care Professionals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1731 (1995).
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all definitions horrific. Termination of nutrition and hydration at an appropriate time to
prevent pain and ease suffering is both medically and ethically appropriate. If the
disability laws can help a family obtain the right to exercise that course of treatment,
the laws should be used to achieve that goal.
V. POTENTIAL CURES: SHEILA POULIOT'S FAMILY'S LAWSUIT, LEGISLATION, AND
OTHER LITIGATION
No state should force anyone to receive medical treatment that is contraindicated
or causes the body severe pain and bodily damage without offering hope of cure. The
laws that gave rise to the Sheila Pouliot case required just that. Although adopted to
protect vulnerable populations, their effect is just the opposite when applied without
limit. The federal courts must limit those laws before anyone else suffers their terrible
effects.
Most commentators, and even some courts, argue that legislation is the best
answer to the problems raised by medical decisionmaking at the end of life." 7 State
lawmakers are undoubtedly better equipped than courts to craft thoughtful policy. They
can consider all aspects of an issue and build specific and careful safeguards into
mechanisms for surrogate decisionmaking. 258 Models of thoughtful and appropriate
legislation are on the books in many states 259 and set forth in scholarly articles.
2 60
Unfortunately, legislation is not forthcoming in all the states that limit the ability
of surrogates to terminate treatment. Indeed, legislation that would give all surrogates
the ability to terminate nutrition and hydration where medically appropriate appears
politically unattainable in some states. In New York, for example, proponents of a
best-interests based surrogacy law for the permanently incompetent have been
unsuccessful in getting a bill passed over the last decade. In other states, courts have
adopted vitalist policies while state legislatures take no action.26 1 The result is that the
patchwork of laws that protect patients has large gaps that could force patients to
receive inappropriate and harmful medical care to prolong their life functions.262
While not the ideal solution, court-driven change is essential to provide an
257. E.g., Hancock, supra note 138, at 651-52; In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531
N.E.2d 607, 616-18 (N.Y. 1988).
258. Indeed New York's legislature did just that in passing the Health Care Decisions Act
for Persons with Mental Retardation. See Golden, supra note 105, at 17-18 (setting forth the
multi-step process a surrogate must go through in New York to terminate life-sustaining
treatment for a principal with mental retardation).
259. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-605(c)(3) (2001) (prohibiting a
surrogate from terminating life-sustaining procedures, including artificial nutrition or hydration,
based upon "either a patient's preexisting long-term mental or physical disability, or patient's
economic disadvantage"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
3102(A) (West Supp. 2003).
260. E.g., Rima J. Oken, Curing Healthcare Providers' Failure to Administer Opioids in
the Treatment of Severe Pain, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 1917 (2002); McKnight & Bellis, supra
note 13; see also, Pratt, supra note 72, at 233-34 (arguing for legislative action to facilitate
palliative care instead of physician assisted suicide).
261. See, e.g., In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wisc. 1992).
262. One result of the present situation is that desperate families are seeking to move sick
and suffering patients across state lines to be allowed to terminate treatment. See, e.g., In re
Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315 (Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991).
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absolute barrier against the inhumane treatment of the incompetent. Ideally, the
Supreme Court or a well-respected circuit court will declare that Cruzan's deference to
the states' interest in preserving life yields to a patient's interest in freedom from
suffering. Such a ruling would prevent more vulnerable people from suffering the
horrible end faced by Sheila Pouliot and would give comfort to healthcare providers
who treat the most profoundly ill patients. The plaintiff in the Blouin v. Spitzer suit
pending before the Second Circuit hopes that her case will establish that right. 263 This
Part analyzes the possibility that Blouin will establish any rights. It then suggests that
another case, one designed to prevent harm to other vulnerable patients before harm
occurs, might be effective if Blouin is not.
A. Will Blouin v. Spitzer Be the Case that Firmly Establishes the Right to Die
Without latrogenic Pain?
The lawsuit brought by Sheila Pouliot' s sister is unlikely to bring money damages
to the Pouliot family. It is possible, however, that it will give meaning to Sheila
Pouliot's death by establishing for the first time a person's right to be free of inhumane
but life-sustaining treatment.
New York officials are almost undoubtedly protected by absolute or qualified
immunity for their actions in the case, making it unlikely that the case will bring money
damages to the family. A public official charged with enforcing the law simply cannot
be held liable for enforcing the law in a court. Thus, absolute immunity protects
officials like Eliot Spitzer from damages arising from "acts undertaken by a prosecutor
in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial. ' '26 Virtually all the
actions by state officials were undertaken in preparation for or as part of judicial
proceedings. And, as the district court held, under New York law (as written at the
time Sheila Pouliot was alive), "where there is no evidence of personal intent, a third
party has no recognized right to decide that a patient's quality of life has declined to a
point where treatment should be withheld and the patient allowed to die., 265 Thus, the
Second Circuit will likely dismiss the case without awarding damages.
The actions that took place before the state took the case to court may fall under
the qualified immunity doctrine, however. Under that standard, the defendants remain
immune from damages, but the court could declare new rights for people like Sheila
Pouliot in reaching that conclusion. Qualified immunity analysis involves a two-step
test. First, it asks "do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a
constitutional right?' '266 If so, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was
clearly established," that is, "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted., 267 Thus, the first step of the
analysis will require the court to address whether the state officials violated Ms.
263. 213 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 02-7997 (2d
Cir. Mar. 5, 2003).
264. Parkinson v. Cozzolino, 238 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)).
265. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (citing People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 302 (N.Y.
1984)).
266. Saucier v. Kate, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
267. Id. at 201-202 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)).
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Pouliot's rights by applying New York law. The court might answer the question on a
very narrow ground. While the facts of the case are egregious, the case against the
officials being sued is not strong. Ms. Pouliot's guardian and family consented to the
order requiring care. It is therefore difficult to see how the state can be held
accountable for her fate.
If the court gets around the threshold factual question to address whether Ms.
Pouliot's rights were violated, the court should conclude that, although the officials
acted in compliance with New York law, her rights were violated. No important state
interest justified the state-required suffering and inappropriate care she endured.
Nonetheless, the Pouliot suit will not survive the second part of the test. The state
officials simply followed the law as written. No case clearly established any of the
rights that were violated.
B. Another Lawsuit
If the Pouliot family's lawsuit is dismissed without a decision on the merits of the
Fourteenth Amendment claim, another might succeed. An action commenced as a
declaratory judgment action could prevent harm before it occurs. Moreover, an action
commenced prospectively could allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, something not raised in the Blouin suit.
268
Whether through the Pouliot family suit or another case, it might be strategically
beneficial to advocates for choice-in-dying to bring an action challenging vitalist
limitations in the law that require continued life-sustaining treatment, rather than to
bring an action to try to establish a right to access to opioids or a limited right to
physician assisted suicide. The court would have to take a much smaller step to
establish a barrier against inhumane treatment than it would to create constitutional
access to aggressive palliative care. The establishment of a barrier to state-inflicted
pain through treatment would then provide a firm foundation for the attainment of an
affirmative right to aggressive pain control.
CONCLUSION
That the law could require a person to be subject to the inhumane treatment
suffered by Sheila Pouliot is shocking. On the other hand, her lingering death is exactly
what commentators predicted when the Supreme Court issued Cruzan. Cruzan's
validation of state laws that allowed vitalism to prevail in the absence of an exercise of
autonomy created situations as in New York and around the country where certain
incompetent individuals must be kept alive.
The failure of the vitalist states' interpretation of Cruzan is their emphasis on the
role of autonomy in refusal of treatment cases. As Quill made clear, however,
autonomy is only one piece of the puzzle, and not the most important one. Instead, the
most important components of the liberty interests are bodily integrity and freedom
from restraint. Both of these rights, well grounded in our nation's history, give rise to a
liberty interest in freedom from state-inflicted suffering and inappropriate medical
268. The suit might not raise the ADA because states are protected from damages suits
under the ADA Eleventh Amendment. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
356. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against states for injunctive relief.
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care.
The Court's reemphasis on the core values of bodily integrity and freedom from
restraint, together with the heightened scrutiny it has applied in forced medication
cases signals its willingness to examine the boundaries of the Cruzan case. Perhaps, in
the end, Sheila Pouliot's death will help to establish those boundaries, and prevent
anyone else from suffering the same terrible fate.
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State Source of Applies to Applicable Limitations or Requirements
Surrogate's Decisions Decisionmaking Applicable to Decisions to
Authority to Standard Withhold Life-Sustaining Treatment
Terminate
Nutrition
and
Hydration
AL ALA. CODE Yes Substituted "IS]urrogate ... may... provide, withdraw or
withhold artificially provided nutrition and§§ 22-8A-6, Judgment hydration if... (1) [tlhe attending physician
22-8A- I1 determines, to a reasonable degree of medical
(1997). certainty that: (a) [tihe individual is no longer
able to understand, appreciate and direct his or
her own medical treatment, and (b) [t]he
individual has no hope of regaining such ability.
(2) Two physicians [who] have personally
examined the individual have diagnosed...
that individual has a terminal illness... or a
condition of permanent unconsciousness. (3)
The attending physician or... surrogate have
no actual knowledge ... of a valid advance
directive [and] (4)... withholding or
withdrawing... of nutrition and hydration will
not result in undue pain or discomfort for the
patient." § 22-8A- II (emphasis added).
AK ALASKA Apparently Best Interest Allows physicians to enter do-not-resuscitate("DNR") orders and make other decisions
STAT. §§ regarding life-sustaining treatment. These
18.12.035, decisions are subject to requests of persons for
18.12.040 whom the order was made, except pregnant
(Michie patients in certain situations.
2002).
AZ ARIz. REV. Yes Substituted Surrogate may not direct physician to withdraw
or withhold life-sustaining nutrition or
STAT. ANN. Judgment hydration, unless surrogate is patient's agent or
§ 36-3231 guardian. § 36-3231(D).
(West 2003).
AR ARK. CODE Yes Best interest '"his suhchapter creates no presunption
concerning the intention of an individual
ANN. §§ 20- [without] a declaration with respect to the use,
17-210, -214 withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
(Michie 2000 treatment in the event of a terminal condition orpermanent unconsciousness. This suhehapter
& Supp. does not... impair ... any right or
2003). responsibility that a person has to effect the
withholding or withdrawal of medical care." §
20-17-2 10(d)&(e).
"Reference to life-sustaining medical treatment
CA CAL. PROB. Yes Best Interest includes not only [extraordinary] treatments...
CODE §§ but also the provision of nutrition, hydration
4711,4714, and medication." In re Christopher 1., 106 Cal.
4 716 App. 4th 533, 548-52 (2003) (employing 12-factor balancing test to determine whether life-
(West Supp. sustaining procedures should he withdrawn).
2003).
CO COO. REV. Yes Best Interest "Artificial nourishment and hydration may he
withheld or withdrawn from a patient upon a
STAT. ANN. decision of a proxy only when the attending
§§ 15-18.5- physician and a second independent physician
101 to -103 trained in neurology or neurosurgery certify inthe patient's medical record that the provision
(West 2002). or continuation of artificial nourishment or
hydration is merely prolonging the act of dying
and is unlikely to result in the restoration of...
independent neurological functioning." § 15-
18.5-103(6) (emphasis added).
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CT CONN. GEN. No Best Interest "If the attending physician does not deem the
incapacitated patient to be in a terminal
STAT. ANN. condition or permanently unconscious.
§ 19a-571 beneficial treatment including nutrition and
(West 1997 & hydration must be provided." 119a-571
Supp. 2003). (emphasis added).
DE DEL. CODE Yes Substituted "A surrogate's decision on behalf of the patientto treat. withdraw or withhold treatment(.
ANN. tit. 16, Judgment including artificial nutrition or hydration.] shall
§2507(995 be made... (I)I in consulsation with attending
& Supp. physician [and (2)) in accordance with the
patient's [wishes based on] patient's personal,
2002). philosophical, religious and ethical values[,j
likelihood of regaining decision making
capacityl.1 likelihood of death.] burdens on
and benefits to the patienti. previous] oral or
written statement. ..by the patient .... If the
surrogate is unable to determine... the
patiem['s wishes, then] in the best interest of
te patient." tit.16 1 2507(bX7).
DC D.C. CODE Yes Best Interest "Nothing in this chapter shall be conued to..
A permit any affirmative or deliberate no to end
ANN. § 21- a human life other than to permit the natural
2210, 21-2212 process of dying." § 21-2212. "Multiple]
(2001). factors [mustl be considered in conducting a
'best interests' analysis in the context of
determining the forbearance or withdrawal of
life-susaining procedures in the case of an
incompetent person. mbe inquiry must (focus
on] the burdens of continued lifel, including
whether prolonging life would be inhumane,]
against the benefits and rewards of furthering
life." In re KI.. 735 A.2d 448. 465 (D.C.
1999).
FL FLA. STAT. Yes Substituted "Before exercising the... patient's right toforego [fife-prolonging] tratinent[. including
ANN. §§ Judgment artificial sustenance and/or hydration) the
765.304, surrogate must be satisfied that: (a) the
765.401 patient does not have a reasonable edicalprobability of recovering capacity so that right(West 1997 & could be exercised by the patient[, and) (b)
Supp. 2003); (that tlhe patient has an end-stage condition.
FLA. STAT. the patient is in a persistent vegetative state, or
the patient's physical condition is terminaL"ANN. § 765.304(2).
765.404 IA proxy's decision to withhold or withdraw
(West Supp. life-prolonging procedures must be supported
by clear ant convincing evidence that the2003). decision would have been the one the patient
would have chosen had the patient been
competent.- § 765.401(3).
Florida also has a provision allowing for
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment if the
patient is in A persistent vegetative state and no
srrogate exists based on the bes interest of
the patien to be determined by a court-
appointed surroitate. See 1765.404.
GA GA. CODE Yes Best Interest 'IThe right to refuse treatmn or indeed to
terminate treatment may be exercised by theANN. § 31-9-2 parents or legal guardian of the infant after
(2001). diagnosis that the infant is terminally ill with no
hope of recovery and that the infant exists in a
chronic vegetative state with no reasonable
possibliny of ataining cognitive function. The
above diagnosis and prognosis must be made
by the attending physician. Two physicians with
no interest in the outcome of the case must
concur in the diagnosis and prognosis." in re
LH.R.. 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga. 1984).
HI HAW. REv. Yes Substituted "A surrogate who has not been designated bythe patient may make all healh-care decisions
STAT. § 327 Judgment for the patient .... except hat artificial
E-5 (Supp. nutriimon and hydration may be withheld or
2004]
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2001). withdrawn... onlywhen the primary physician
anda scond independent physician certify...
ta the provision or continuation of aificil
hydration or nutrition s merely prolonging the
act of dying and the patient is highly unlikely to
have any neurological response in the future." §
327E-5(g) (emphasis added).
I ID.O CODE Y e BestGives general medical deeisionmaking authorityID 39- Ep3 without mentioning utrition and hydration.
(Michie
2002).
111 755 ILL. Yes Substituted A decision to withhold or withdraw fife-
sustaining treatment made on ehalf of a minor
COMP. STAT. Judgment or an adu who lacks capacity may he made by
ANN. 40/20, a surrogate if the patient (1) is deemed to have
40/25 (West a terminal condition. (2)is in a state ofpermanent unconsciousness, or (3) has an
1992 & Supp. incurable or irreversible condition. lit. 755 §
2002). 40/20b-SX 1).
14D (W EsesIn"We conclud e that he administration ofIN ID. C DE. Yes estInteest artificial nutrition and hydration ... is medical
ANN. §§ 16- treament which can be refused, Three sources
36-1-1 to -4, - infurin our understanding: the ... Indiana
6, -, -11 O -medical comnity, Indiana statutory law,
6,-8 -11to -including the H[ealth] C[are] C[onsent] A[ct];
14 (West and persuasive authority from numerous courts
1997); §§ 16- across the county." In re Lawrance. 579
36-5, -7, -9,- N.E.2d 32. 39 (Ind. 1999).
10 (West
1997 & Supp.
2002).
IA IOWA CODE Yes Substituted Life-sustaining procedures, including hydrationand/or nutrition via intubation, may be withheld
ANN. Judgment or withdrawn by a qualified surrogate, either a
§ 144A.7 certain fanily member or a duly appointed(West 1997 & guardian, so long as the patient is comatose or(est0 in terminal condition and the patient is tan
Supp. 2003). pregnant and that pregnancy could be brought
to term by providing life-sustaining procedures.
I 144A.7.
KA KAN. STAT. Yes st ntet Two physicians must certify that the patient is
in PVS or suffering from an illness for which
ANN. § 59- further treatment would not prolong life and
3075(7) court must approve certification.
(2002).
KY. REV. Yes Substituted
KY STAT. ANN. Judgment "A... surrogate[, with or without an advancedKY 3n directive.1 may authorize the withdrawal or
H 311.629, wihholding ofartificially provided nutrition
311.631 and hydration (when: (1)1 inevitable death is
(Michie imminent, [(2) patient is... permanently
unconscious[, (3) wlhen the provision of2001). artificial nutrition cannot be physically
assitilated by the person or [(4) wihen the
burden of
... nutrition and hydration... outweigh[s] its
_ bcefit." j 311.629(3) (emphasis added).
LA L. REV. Yes Best I t When a comatose or incompetent person whois physically or mentally incapable of
STAT. ANN. communication has been certified in writing as
§§ having a terminal and irreversible condition and
40:1299.53, has not made a previous declaration, removalof fe-sustaining procedures, including artificial
.58.5 (West hydration or nutrition may be authorized by a
2001). surrogate.
ME ME. REV. Yes Best Itst Withdrawal or withholding of life-sustainingtreatment can be authorized by a surrogate if
STAT. ANN. the patient has been determined to have a
tit. 18-A terminal condition or be in a persistent
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§ 5-805 vegetative state. tit. 18-A j 5-805(a).
(West 1998 &
Supp. 2002).
MD MD. CODE Yes Substituted 'T7he decision of a surrogate regarding whetherlife-sustaining procedures[, including artificial
ANN., Judgment hydration and/or nutrition] should be provided,
HEALTH-GEN. ... shall not be based, in whole or in part, on
either a patient's preexisting ... mental or
physical disability, or a patient's economic
§ 5-605 disadvantage." I 5-605(c)3).
(2000).
The prolongation of life without consideration
MA Superintenden Yes Substituted as to the previously stated wishes of the patient
tof Judgment and for period of several years is intrusive as a
Belchertown matter of law, and therefore the "G-tube" could
State Sch. v. be removed at the request of a guardian withproof that this course of treatment would have
Saikewicz, been approved of by the patient. Brophy v.
370 N.E.2d New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d
417, 431 626 (Mass. 1986) (citing Saikewicz, 370
(Mass. 1977). N.E.2d at 431).
MI In re Martin, Yes Substituted Limited to cases where surrogate can establish
538 N.W.2d Judgment clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
wishes expressed while competent. See Martin,
399 (Mich. 538 N.W.2d at 410-11.
1995).
MN 2003 Minn. Apparently Best Interest "Minnesota courts have the power to authorize
AL.S. 12 § a conservator to order the removal of a
conservatee's life support systems." Torres,
37(A)(4)(1); 357 N.W.2d at 339-40.
In re Torres,
357 N.W.2d
332 (Minn.
1984).
MS Miss. CODE Yes Substituted "If the patient... lack[s) capacity .. and [a)
surrogate is not .. available, consent may be
ANN. Judgment given by an owner, operator or employee of a
§§ 41-41-211 residential long-term health care institution at
-215 (1999 & which the patient is a resident if there is noadvance health.care directive ... and a licensed
Supp. 2002). physician .. has determined that the patient is
in need of health care. This power (does not.
however, extend to consent to [remove orl
withhold [artificiall nutrition land/or]
hydration." § 4141-215(9).
MO Cuzan v. Yes Substituted clear and convincing evidence of specific
subjective interest is requited for the
Dir., Mo. Judgment withdrawal of artificial nutrition or hydration.
Dep't of Cruzan. 497 U.S. at 316-22.
Health, 497
U.S. 261
(1990).
MT MONT. CODE Yes Substituted Life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn from a patient who is "in a terminal
ANN. § 50-9- Judgment condition and no longer able to make decisions
106(2001). regarding the administration of life-sustaining
treatment: and... has no effective
declaration." § 50-9-106. However, this does
not apply if the patient is pregnant and the
provision of nutrition and hydration would
allow the fetus to mature to term. Id.
In nr Tabatha R., 564 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Neb.NE NEB. REV. Apparently Substituted 1997) recognizes right of surrogate to
STAT. ANN. Judgment terminate treatment but does not explicitly
§§ 30- address nutrition and hydration.
2628(3), 43-
285(1)
1 (Michie I I I
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NV NEV. REV. Yes Substituted 'he authority to consent or to withhold
consent [for life-sustaining treatment] may be
STAT. ANN. § Judgment exercised by [the patient's]: (a)... spouse[1
449.626 (b) ... adult child of the patient[,j (c)...(Michie parents.l (d) ... adult sibling of the patienttl
(c) [the nearest other adult relative .... A
2000). decision... mast be made in good faith[, and
not contrary to the expressed desires of the
patient.]" § 449.626(2), (4).
Best Interest Statute gives broad power to guardian to
NH N.H. REV. Apparently Bestconsent to medical treatment but says nothing
STAT. ANN. § directly pertinent to nutrition and hydration.
464-A:25
(1992 &
2002).
NJ In re Quinlan, Yes Substituted *[Llife-sustaining treatment may he withdrawn
or withheld whenever there is clear and
355 A.2d 647 Judgment convincing proof that if the patient were
(N.J. 1976). competent, he or she would decline the
treatment." In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425(NJ. 1987).
NM N.M. STAT. Yes Substituted "A surrogate may make a health-care decision
ANN. § 24- Judgment for a patient who is an adult or emancipated
minor if the patient has been determined... to
7A-5 (Michie lack capacity and no agent or guardian has been
2003). appointed or the agent or guardian is not
reasonably available." § 24-7A-5(l).
NY N.Y. SURR. Yes Best Interest lA srrogate of al mentally retarded
CT. PROC. (patient'sl best interests shall include
consideration of:... (iv) the unique nature of
ACT LAW artificially provided nutrition or hydration, and
§ 1750-b the effect it may have on the mentally retarded
(McKinney person." § 1750-b(2)(iv).
Supp. 2003)
(Only for
people with
mental
retardation).
NC N.C. GEN. Yes Best Interest "if a person is comatose and there is no
STAT. § 90- reasonable possibility that he [or she] will
322 (2000). return to a cognitive sapient state or is mentally
incapacitated, and the life of the person could
be or is being sustained by artificial nutrition or
hydration... then, extraordinary mans or
artificial nutrition or hydration maybe ...
discontinued." I 90-322(a)(4).
ND N.D. CENT. Yes Best Interest "in the absence of a written statement
CODE §§ 23- concerning nutrition or hydration, nutrition or
12-13, 23-64- hydration. or both. may be withdrawn or
withheld if the attending physician has
6.1 (2002). determined that the administration of nutrition
or hydration is inappropriate because the
nutrition or hydration cannot be physically
assimiled by the patient or would be
physically harnful or would cause unreasonable
physical pain to the patient." § 23-6.4-6.1.
OH OHIO REV. Yes Substituted "tllf the patient did not previously express his
CODE ANN. § Judgment intention with respect to the use or
2133.08 continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal.
of life.sustaining treatment should he
(Anderson subsequently be in a terminal condition or in a
1999). permanently unconscious state ... and no
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longer able to make informed decisions
regarding the administration of life-sustaining
treatment, a consent given pursuant to this
section shall be valid only if it is consistent with
the type of informed consent decision that the
patient would have made if he previously had
expressed his intention with respect to the use
or continuation, or the withholding or
withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment should
he subsequently he in a terminal condition or in
a permanently unconscious state, whichever
applies, and no longer able to make informed
decisions regarding the administration of life-
sustaining treatment, as inferred from the
lifestyle and character of the patient, and from
any other evidence of the desires of the patient,
prior to his becoming no longer able to make
informed decisions regarding the administration
of life-sustaining treatment." § 2133.08(D)(3).
OK OKLA. STAT. Apparently Substituted "An individual making life-sustaining decisions
ANN. tit. 63, Judgment/Best ... for a declarant shall make such decisions
based on the known intentions, personal views§ 3102(A) Interest and best interests of the declarant. If evidence
(West Supp. of the declarant's wishes is sufficient, those
2003). wishes shall control. If there is not sufficient
evidence of the wishes of the declarant, the
decisions shall be based on the reasonable
judgment of the individual so deciding about
the values of the declarant and what the wishes
of the declarant would be based upon those
values." Tit. 63 § 3101.16(A).
OR OR. REv. Yes Substituted "It shall be presumed that every person who is
STAT. §§ Judgment temporarily or permanently incapable has
consented to artificially administered nutrition127.635, and hydration that are necessary to sustain life
127.680 except in one or mare of the following
(2001). circumstances (a) the person while a capable
adult stated that he/she would have refused
artificial nutrition and hydration, (b)
administration of such nutrition and hydration
is not medically feasible or would itself cause
severe, intractable or long-lasting pain. (c) the
person has an appointed health care
representative who has been given authority to
make decisions on the use, maintenance,
withholding or withdrawing of artificially
administered nutrition and hydration, (d) the
person does not have an appointed health care
representative or an advance directive that
clearly states that the person did not want
artificial nutrition and hydration, and the person
is permanently unconscious, (e) the person
does not have an appointed health care
representative or an advance directive that
clearly states that the person did not want
artificial nutrition and hydration, the person is
incapable, and the person has a terminal
condition, or () the person has a progressive
illness that will be fatal and is in an advanced
stage, and it is very unlikely that the person's
condition will substantially improve." §
127.680.
PA In re Fiori, Yes Substituted "[This] court has been asked to pennit the
Pwithdrawal of life sustaining treatment from a
652 A.2d Judgment patient in a persistent vegetative state, and [we
1350 (Pa. have held) that if it can be definitely determinedSuper. Ct. that it would have been the patient's desire notto receive such treatment, then the patient's
1995). right to self-determination outweighs any state
interest and the treatment may be withdrawn."
In re Fori 652 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995).
RI R.I. GEN. Apparently Substituted No restrictions noted. In re Doe, 533 A.2d
523, 526 (R.I. 1987), acknowledges the right
LAWS § 33- Judgment of a surrogate to decline treatment.
15-29 (1995).
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Sc S.C. CODE Apparently Substituted Limited by intentions of patient expressed while
competent.
ANN. § 44-66- Judgment
30 (Law. Co-
op. 2002).
SD S.D. Unclear Best Inueresd] Life-sustaining treatment is required forCODIF.D. AlBet res/ pregnant women. § 59-7-2.8 (Michie 1994).CODIFIED Acceptable
LAws Medical Practice
ANNOTATED
§ 34-12C-3,
59-7-2.8
(Michie
1994).
A surrogate may authorize the removal or
TN TENN. CODE Yes Substituted withholding of nutrition or hydration if there is
ANN. § 34-3- Judgment clear and convincing evidence that if the patient
104(2001). were competent, he or she would chose that
particular course of treatment. San Juan-
Torregosa v. Garcia, 80 S.W.3d 539, 545
___________ ____________ (Tent. Ct. App. 2002).
TEX. HEALTH Yes Substituted "If the patient does not have a legal guardian or
TX Han agent under a medical power of attorney, the
& SAFETY Judgment attending physician and [the patient's spouse,
CODE ANN. adult children, parents or nearest living relative)
§§ 166.035, may make a treatment decision that mayinclude to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
166.039, treatmen."§ 166.039(b).
313.001-.007
(Vernon
2001).
UT UTAHl CODE Yes Best Interest -If a person 18 years of age or older has not
ANN. executed a directive or power of attorney...
§ 75-2-1105- and is unable to conmamnicate, and the
1107 attending physician has determined that theperson is in terminal condition .... life-(1993 & sustaining procedures may be withheld or
Supp. 2003). withdrawn under the supervision of the
attending physician [if he/shol consult[s] with.
. another physician [and the family of the
_ patient]." § 75-2-1107.
VT VT. STAT. N/A N/A Limited to court-appointed guardians.
ANN. tit. 14
§ 3069(5),
3075 (2003).
Substituted An attending physician may withhold or
VA VA. CODE Yes Swithdraw life-prolonging procedures with the
ANN. Judgment consent of a guardian. spouse, adult child,
§ 54.1-2986 parent, adult sibling, or any other relative. §
(Michie 54.1-2986.
2002).
WASH. REV. Yes Substituted "We hold that the right of a terminally ill
WA Wpatient to have life sustaining procedures
CODE ANN. Judgment/Best withheld includes the right to withhold
§ 7.75.065 Interest nasogastric tubes, intravenous feeding, and
other artificial means of nutrition and(West 1992). hydration." In re Guardianship of Grant, 747
P.2d 445, 455 (Wash. 1987).
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V W. VA. CODE Yes Substituted h'e surrogate is authorized to make health
care decisions[, including withholding orANN. § 16-30- Judgment withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.] on
8 (Michie behalf of the incapacitated person without a
2001 & Supp. court order or judicial involvement." § 16-30-8.
2003). W. VA.
CODE ANN. §
16-30-9
(Michie
2001).
WI In re eGuardian of person in persistent vegetative
IeYes Best Interes state may terminate nutrition and hydration if in
Guardianship Substituted patient's best interest, but if patient is
of L.W., 482 Judgment cognizant, guardian must prove subjective
N.W.2d 60 intent of patient. Spaha v. Eisenberg (In re
Guardianship of Edna M.F.), 563 N.W.2d 485,(Wis. 1992). 489-90 (Wis. 1997).
Y WYO. STAT. Yes Substituted 'When an incompetent person who has not
WY Wexecuted a [directivel is certified as suffering
ANN. Judgment from a terminal condition or an irreversible
§§ 3-5-209(b), coma .... a physician may withhold or
withdraw life sustaining procedures from that35-22-105(b) person when all faily members who can he
(Michie contacted through reasonable diligence agree in
2003). good faith that the patient, if competent, would
choose to forego that treatment." §§ 3-5-
209(b), 35-22-105(b).

